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In early 2011, local and national media reported on a violent incident in the village 
of Ajun Jeumpet, in the district of Aceh Besar, Aceh province. A group of (male) 
villagers had forced its way into a house to "arrest" the resident, a middle-aged man, 
as well as his visitor, an eighteen-year-old woman. The two were dragged out of the 
house and accused of khalwat (illicit proximity of an unmarried couple of opposing
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sexes), a criminal offense under syariah legislation.2 According to local reporters, the 
man was an amateur photographer while the woman acted as his "model." Reports 
about what happened after the raid diverge. Some observers stated that the couple was 
handed over, immediately, to the Wilayatul Hisbah (WH, the so-called "syariah 
police"). Other reports stated that they were taken to the local police station first.3 
Either way, a few months after the arrest, the couple was brought before the syariah 
court (Mahkamah Syariah) in Jantho, the administrative center of Aceh Besar district. 
Both of them were found guilty and sentenced to the lash. The sanction—seven strokes 
for the man, four for the woman—was carried out on April 8, 2011. In the meantime, 
three men had been accused by the woman's parents of sexually harassing their 
daughter. The young woman had been stripped bare and grabbed indecently during 
the arrest. One man, a forty-five-year-old civil servant, was taken into custody and 
brought to trial. The others were not.
Alarmed by this apparent lack of interest in persecuting vigilantes, local human 
rights activists issued a statement. The provincial branch of KontraS, a renowned 
Indonesian human rights group, estimated that more than a hundred cases of street 
justice related to syariah had occurred in the preceding three years, including unlawful 
imprisonment, raids of public spaces, and beatings. KontraS coordinator Hendra Fadli 
urged the State Syariah Agency (Dinas Syariat Islam) to "educate people in the 
province to prevent them from taking justice into their own hands in the name of 
Islam."4 Evi Narti Zain, executive director of the human rights coalition HAM Aceh 
(Hak Asasi Manusia Aceh), added that "conducting street justice and vigilante 
crackdowns on people's homes simply because of alleged violations of Shariah law 
constitutes a violation of human rights."5
Vigilante violence, or "street justice," is one of the most contentious aspects of the 
current implementation of syariah in Aceh. According to human rights advocates, the 
Islamic penal code (which was introduced in the early 2000s) has encouraged local 
communities to police public morality in their own villages and neighborhoods, spy on 
their neighbors' activities, and carry out violent punishment of alleged violators of 
syariah-based norms. Disciplinary measures include heavy-handed arrests, beatings, 
forced marriages, sexual harassment, and the practice of publicly cleansing accused 
wrongdoers with sewage water.6 Reports such as these have stated that local
2 The spelling system employed in this article for Indonesian terms of Arabic origin is that conventionally 
used in Indonesia. I have not included diacritics, except when directly quoting published materials using 
other systems. Thus, the term "shari ‘a" (literally "way" or "path," commonly translated as "Islamic law") 
has been transliterated here as "syariah." It should be noted, however, that in Aceh, various transliterations
are in use, including "syariah" and "syariat (Islam)."
3 "Pasangan selingkuh dicambuk 9 kali," Serambi Indonesia, April 9, 2011; "Fotografer 'Bugil' Dihukum 
Cambuk," April 9, 2011, http: / / www.jpnn.com/read/2011/04/09/89117/Fotografer-%27Bugil%27- 
Dihukum-Cambuk-, accessed July 29, 2014; "Indonesian Couples Caned over Extramarital Affairs," April 
9, 2011, http: / / www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/indonesian-couples-caned-over-extramarital-affairs/, 
accessed July 29, 2014; and "Pelaku mesum pingsan setelah dihukum cambuk," http: / / www. 
mediaindonesia.com/ read / 2011 / 04/04/ 216484/126/101 /Pelaku-Mesum-Pingsan-setelah-Dihukum- 
Cambuk, accessed November 13, 2012.
4 "Activists Denounce Shariah Vigilante Justice in Aceh," April 13, 2011, www.thejakartaglobe.com, 
accessed December 12, 2012.
5 Ibid.
6 For example, a report by the International Crisis Group stated that the "existence" of the Wilayatul 
Hisbah alone "encourages citizens to report their friends and neighbors for suspected breaches of moral
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authorities, including the police, district and provincial administrators, and 
magistrates, do little to curb these human rights abuses and in some cases even openly 
approve of them. These conclusions contrast sharply with the opinions voiced by 
prominent officials involved in the process of syariah implementation, who typically 
state that Islamic law should be regarded as a form of protection against, rather than 
encouragement of, vigilante violence.7
Although I share many of these concerns, I am critical of viewing vigilante violence 
and morality policing exclusively, or even primarily, within the framework of Islamic 
law. I recognize three problems. Firstly, the exclusivist framework of state syariah offers 
few possibilities for understanding why people in Aceh think that violence is justified 
in some situations and not in others, even if the alleged offence appears to be the same. 
Secondly, a tight focus on state syariah offers little room for the analysis of different 
kinds of violence and its interpretation by people in Aceh. Thirdly, and most 
importantly, a dominant focus on the legal particularities of syariah hides from view 
the ways in which local conflicts about public morality issues are connected to broader 
contestations about moral authority and public space in the Acehnese post-conflict, 
post-tsunami context.
This essay discusses the occurrence of vigilante violence in Aceh and its relation to 
the project of state syariah. I will argue that the important underlying dynamic is not 
the implementation of Islamic law as such, but a much deeper, more complex and 
versatile conflict about social control and moral authority in present-day Aceh. This 
contestation is informed both by the discursive genealogies of particular normative 
traditions (which include, but are not limited to, the various interpretations of Islamic 
law), and by the lived realities of the post-conflict, post-disaster context. As I will try to 
show, syariah serves as a powerful label for explaining and justifying action. At the 
same time, an exclusive focus on state syariah conceals the process by which the state 
has interacted with local actors to formulate, enforce, and contest "local" norms. 
Locality, I argue, is both a crucial and a neglected lens for analyzing the present 
struggle for authority in Aceh and for understanding the social, cultural, and political 
patterns that make possible, or prevent, the use of violence by non-state actors. Central, 
in this respect, is the extent to which village-level authorities are able to reconcile, on 
the one hand, their role as agents of the state, and, on the other hand, their role in 
protecting the moral spaces connected to the idea—and centrality in Acehnese social 
and cultural life—of "village community" (A: gampong).
The following sections deal with broad social and political changes as well as 
specific cases of morality policing. The essay builds on a diverse set of data, including 
literature, media reports, formal interviews, and everyday fieldwork observations, 
collected during multiple visits to Aceh in the period 2008-12. I begin with some 
conceptual and comparative reflections on vigilantism in Indonesia, then proceed with 
an outline of historical and socio-political developments in Aceh. The core of the article
behavior." International Crisis Group, "Islamic Law and Criminal Justice in Aceh," Asia Report No. 117, 
2006. Human Rights Watch advanced a similar argument, stating that the law on khalwat "encourages 
private individuals to participate in the implementation of the law." Human Rights Watch, "Policing 
Morality: Abuses in the Application of Sharia in Aceh, Indonesia," December 2010.
7 See, for example, R. Michael Feener, Shari'a and Social Engineering: The Implementation of Islamic Law in 
Contemporary Aceh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 243.
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is formed by the third section, which discusses in detail a number of cases. In the final 
section before the conclusion, I elaborate on the specificities of these cases to 
investigate, at a more general level, the connections between vigilante violence and 
state practice. The conclusion revisits and draws some broader implications from my 
argument about the relationship between vigilantism, the social construction of locality, 
and the struggle for moral authority in contemporary Aceh.
Vigilantism, the State, and the Problem of Locality
The study of Aceh has tended to privilege the region's history of rebellion and the 
strong "piety" of its inhabitants. I have dealt with the problems of (ethnic) stereotypes 
and Acehnese exceptionalism elsewhere.8 As for my present concern with vigilante 
violence, two problems should be identified. Firstly, an emphasis on resistance against 
the state tends to close off, beforehand, the analysis of state practices developing on the 
ground and the role in this process of the Acehnese themselves. Secondly, a focus on 
regional particularities poses a risk that observers might ignore the fact that vigilante 
violence is, simultaneously, an international phenomenon and a national concern, tied 
to the social and political changes resulting from the collapse of the New Order regime 
in 1998.9 These problems may be avoided by shifting the level of analysis, 
simultaneously, upwards, taking into account global and national developments, and 
downwards, toward a grounded analysis of local tensions and contestations.
A key mediating force between these different levels is the state. In this article, the 
state is viewed simultaneously as an actor and as an arena of contestation.10 In order to 
answer the question why citizens, in particular historical and cultural contexts, decide 
to take the law into their own hands, it is insufficient to point at the "absence" of the 
state or its incapacity to provide for justice. Instead, we must be sensitive to the context 
of a fragmented state, consisting of a "patchwork of de facto jurisdictions, each with its 
own 'morality' and each policed by self-appointed vigilantes, as well as by the police 
and the army."11 In most cases, "non-state or self-policing has a very long historical 
trajectory to which the history of state policing, not just state failures, has contributed 
in large measure."12 In other words, both the role of the state and the "systemic"
8 David Kloos, "A Crazy State: Violence, Psychiatry, and Colonialism in Aceh, ca. 1910-1942," Bijdragen tot 
de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde 170,1 (2014); and "Images of Violence and Piety in Aceh," in Islam, Politics, 
and Change: The Indonesian Experience, 1998-2013, ed. Leon Buskens, Kees van Dijk and Nico Kaptein 
(Leiden: Leiden University Press, forthcoming).
9 The wave of communal violence after 1998 must be understood, at least partly, in the context of the 
transition to democracy. In the words of Edward Aspinall: "The 'national model' by which minority 
groups had been incorporated into Indonesia's political system, and by which they attained access to 
material resources, was suddenly up for re-negotiation. The field of opportunity opened up by the 
regime's collapse encouraged some groups to push violently to change the terms of their incorporation to 
their advantage, resolve long-standing grievances, get better access to natural or state resources, and so on. 
Most did so by peaceful political mobilization; some did so violently." Edward Aspinall, "Ethnic and 
Religious Violence in Indonesia: A Review Essay," Australian Journal o f International Affairs 62,4 (2008): 560.
10 See Joshua Barker and Gerry van Klinken, "Reflections on the State in Indonesia," in State of Authority: 
The State in Society in Indonesia, ed. Gerry van Klinken and Joshua Barker (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast 
Asia Program Publications, 2009).
11 Joshua Barker, "Vigilantes and the State," Social Analysis 50,1 (2006): 206.
12 Atreyee Sen and David Pratten, "Global Vigilantes: Perspectives on Justice and Violence," in Global 
Vigilantes, ed. David Pratten and Atreyee Sen (London: Hurst & Company, 2007), p. 6.
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aspects of violence (that is, the ways in which violence is "sedimented" in everyday 
life), is always rooted in complex historical processes.13
In colonial Indonesia, the state made extensive use of local strongmen to maintain 
its authority, a situation that finds an analogy in the late New Order, during which it 
became increasingly difficult to distinguish between the instruments of state repression 
and local criminals or thugs (preman).14These blurred boundaries go some way in 
explaining why, after 1998, it became "common for citizens themselves to mete out 
punishments to those suspected as having committed a crime or an offense."15 "Mob 
justice," instead of a direct result of state weakness, must be viewed as an established 
repertoire of action extending well into the past. "What changed in 1998," writes Freek 
Colombijn, "was not so much the degree of dissatisfaction with the weak judicial 
apparatus, but the changed perception of the risk that participants in mob justice will 
be prosecuted by a weak judiciary."16
Similar arguments have been advanced with regard to religiously motivated 
violence.17 In Lombok, where religious minorities have been threatened by civilian 
"security groups" claiming to represent the island's Muslim majority, state officials 
"find it more difficult [compared to the New Order period] to demonize those who 
upset stability and order."18 Nicholas Herriman, in his work on the killing of alleged 
"sorcerers" in East Java in 1998-99, writes that this form of "community justice" 
existed before, but that it was held in check by the state. In 1998, "stronger doubts" 
emerged with regard to the willingness and capacity of the state to take action against 
such violence, "resulting in an almost universal sense of an opportunity [kesempatan] to 
kill the 'sorcerers' in one's village."19 While the killings in East Java were committed
13 Patricia Spyer, "Some Notes on Disorder in the Indonesian Postcolony," in Law and Disorder in the 
Postcolony, ed. Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press), p. 189.
14 Joshua Barker, "State of Fear: Controlling the Criminal Contagion in Suharto's New Order," Indonesia 66 
(October 1998): 7—42; Henk Schulte Nordholt, "A Genealogy of Violence," in Roots of Violence in Indonesia: 
Contemporary Violence in Historical Perspective, ed. Freek Colombijn and Jan Thomas Lindblad (Leiden: 
KITLV Press, 2002); and Loren Ryter, "Pemuda Pancasila: The Last Loyalist Free Men of Suharto's 
Order?," Indonesia 66 (October 1998): 45-73.
15 Barker, "Vigilantes and the State," p. 203.
16 Freek Colombijn, "Maling, Maling! The Lynching of Petty Criminals," in Roots o f Violence in Indonesia, 
ed. Colombijn and Lindblad, p. 324.
17 Violence against religious minorities, alleged "enemies of Islam," or social deviants more generally has 
become a common feature of post-New Order Indonesia. Christians, but also Muslim minorities (notably 
Shi'a communities and members of the minority Ahmadiyah sect), as well as individuals and local 
communities accused of engaging in "un-Islamic" behavior," have become the target of vigilantes. In 2012, 
the Jakarta-based SETARA Institute for Democracy and Peace counted 264 violations of freedom of 
religion, compared to 135 incidents in 2007. See "Report on Freedom of Religion and Belief in 2007,"
http: / / www.setara-institute.org/ en/ content/ report-freedom-religion-and-belief-2007, accessed April 8, 
2014. For the position of the Ahmadiyah, see International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Implications of the 
Ahmadiyah Decree," Asia Briefing No. 78 (2008). For a more general attempt to explain the "conservative 
turn" in Indonesian Islam, see Martin van Bruinessen, ed., Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: 
Explaining the "Conservative Turn" (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013).
18 Kari Telle, "Vigilante Citizenship: Sovereign Practices and the Politics of Insult in Indonesia," Bijdragen 
tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde 169-2/3 (2013): 207.
19 Nicholas Herriman, "'Sorcerer' Killings in Banyuwangi: A Re-examination of State Responsibility for 
Violence," Asian Studies Review 31,1 (March 2007): 70. Often, Herriman found, the people responsible for 
the killings were "family, neighbors, and friends" of the victims. He thus distinguished between the role of 
ordinary villagers and the views that have cited conspiracies (for example, by the army) or emphasized 
"state responsibility." James Siegel, in his investigation of the same phenomenon, argued that the killings
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out of a real sense of threat, the violence was also encouraged and legitimized by 
political and religious leaders, who actively produced, or reproduced, local myths, 
rumors, and fears.20 In Lombok, the opposite happened. Local gangs used rumors and 
(the threat of) violence to raise their agendas, forcing the state to come to action and 
"correct those who provoked their outrage in the first place."21
In both cases, an appeal to the need to uphold "order" and "justice" is central. It is 
rather conspicuous, then, that the literature about vigilante violence in Indonesia pays 
relatively little attention to the question of how non-state actors decide what is "just," 
and what social and political institutions they turn to at those times when they are 
uncertain about this. As John Comaroff and Jean Comaroff have emphasized, in 
postcolonial societies violence and the law are intimately related.22 But if the use of 
violence is part of a cultural "repertoire," then what else is there to be found in this 
repertoire that speaks to the threats and injustices that destabilize the social or moral 
"order"? In my view, conceptions of the law—and their relation to authority—cannot 
be understood properly without examining the ways in which these concepts connect 
to a sense of the "local." Here, I refer to "questions of location, timing, durability and 
modes of violence,"23 but also to a less explored problem, namely, how the dialectic 
between violence and authority depends on the very perception of "locality" itself. 
Moral authority exists because people in a certain place—or moving between different 
places—vest their trust in, and prepare to submit to, particular leaders or institutions. 
At the same time, there is a natural tension between senses of the local and the 
normative claims that aim to transcend, break through, or abolish spatial boundaries. 
Thus, any analysis of morality policing requires careful conceptual reflection on the 
social construction, everyday experience, and salience of the local.
All forms of violence are, ultimately, localized. However, compared to outbreaks of 
large-scale political and communal violence, vigilantes seem to depend even more on a 
clear (or at least persuasive) definition of the local. Vigilantism (and related forms of 
"routine," "small-scale," and "social" violence) may be distinguished from other forms 
of communal violence on the basis that it is not commonly labeled, at least not directly, 
as "political."24 Connected to this is the fact that social violence takes place, typically, in 
villages (rather than, for example, cities and city centers, industrial complexes, or sites
must be attributed to a fundamental uncertainty (and resulting anxiety) about the question what, exactly, 
is meant by the term "witch" (tukang santet, or tukang sihir). The New Order played a central role in 
defining the qualities and attributes of the forces of "good" and of "evil." Once the regime collapsed, witch 
hunts provided communities with a "means for local control of general—or national—malevolence when 
state control failed." See James T. Siegel, Naming the Witch (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005),
p. 161.
20 Nicholas Herriman, "The Great Rumor Mill: Gossip, Mass Media, and the Ninja Fear," The Journal of 
Asian Studies 69,3 (August 2010).
21 Telle, "Vigilante Citizenship," p. 207.
22 John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, "Law and Disorder in the Postcolony: An Introduction," in Law 
and Disorder in the Postcolony, ed. Comaroff and Comaroff (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 
2006). As Barker states, paraphrasing Walter Benjamin, vigilante violence, especially when drawing on 
established (religious and other) moral frameworks, has "law-making" qualities. Barker, "Vigilantes and 
the State," p. 206.
23 Aspinall, "Ethnic and Religious Violence in Indonesia," p. 559.
24 For a recent and important collective attempt to elaborate, both analytically and methodologically, on 
this distinction, see Ashutosh Varshney, ed., Collective Violence in Indonesia (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2010).
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vested with or symbolizing political power).25 While this may lead to new questions 
about the nature of political violence in Indonesia, it also means that explanations for 
vigilante violence must take into account the ways in which moral spaces are 
constructed and tied to ideas about the concept of the village, including its social as 
well as its spatial characteristics.
In order to address the problem of the spatial distribution of violence, moreover, it 
is necessary to ask how local factors relate to broad regional and national trends and 
concerns. Bridget Welsh, who combined quantitative data (based on newspaper 
reporting) and ethnographic case studies to study mob violence (keroyakan) in four 
different Indonesian provinces, places the emphasis on local leadership and the extent 
to which, in particular regions, mob violence is socialized or historically "imprinted."26 
Mobbing, Welsh argues, occurs when local leaders either legitimize the violence, fail to 
take action against it, or act as mobilizing actors themselves. While I subscribe to 
Welsh's argument that local leadership is central, her approach allows little conceptual 
footing from which one might analyze the construction, negotiation, and limitation of 
leadership roles in particular settings (i.e., social and cultural), or the question of how 
these processes are shaped by concepts of space and territory. More useful, in this 
respect, is Joshua Barker's insightful study of security in urban Bandung, in which he 
distinguishes between practices of "surveillance" and practices of "territoriality," each 
pertaining to a very different concept of security.27 The actions of the police and other 
state institutions categorized as hansip (pertahanan sipil, "civil defense") are aimed at 
"penetrating" neighborhoods, replacing traditional practices of order-keeping with 
forms of state surveillance. In contrast, traditional institutions like the ronda 
(neighborhood watches), as well as the activities of local strongmen and preman, are 
based on "territorial relationships."28 In this framework, the state syariah system in 
Aceh is an example of surveillance. Like in Bandung, however, state power is limited 
by local claims to territoriality and associated performances of authority. This may be 
kept in mind as we move, in the following sections, towards a more grounded 
perspective of vigilante violence in Aceh.
Conflict, Shifting Discourses, and the Politics of Public Morality in Aceh
Discourse about public morality in Aceh often is connected to the perceived 
responsibility of the state in protecting the region's "strong" Islamic identity. 
According to official statistics, 98 percent of Aceh's circa four million inhabitants 
consider themselves to be Muslim, with a large majority being ethnically Acehnese. 
Historically, Islam has played an important role in the development of Acehnese self­
25 Gerry van Klinken has focused on geography and economic interests as interrelated explanatory factors 
for political violence in Indonesia. See Gerry van Klinken, Communal Violence and Democratization in 
Indonesia: Small Town Wars (London: Routledge, 2007). As far as I know, however, there are no similar 
studies that focus on the kinds of violence that are not (commonly viewed as) "political" in nature.
26 Bridget Welsh, "Local and National: Lynch Mobs in Indonesia," in Varshney, Collective Violence in 
Indonesia.
27 Joshua Barker, "Surveillance and Territoriality in Bandung," in Figures of Criminality in Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Colonial Vietnam, ed. Vicente L. Rafael (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program 
Publications, 1999).
28 For another discussion of the practices and culture of the ronda, see James T. Siegel, Solo in the New Order: 
Language and Hierarchy in an Indonesian City (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), pp. 39-43.
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consciousness and emerging nationalism, from the "Holy War" against Dutch colonial 
domination (1873-1942) to the emergence of the separatist rebellion waged by the 
ethno-nationalist Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, Aceh Independence Movement) 
(1976-2005). Both in the early years of the Indonesian republic and during the years 
following the collapse of the New Order—periods in which the relationship with 
Jakarta was redefined—contestations emerged within Aceh about the questions 
regarding what status should be given to Islamic law, what interpretation of the law 
should be followed, and who should have the formal authority to make those 
decisions. It is important, therefore, to give an overview of these historical trajectories, 
and to ask how the current implementation of syariah both builds on and departs from 
earlier state interventions, and how local contestations complicate the standard 
narrative of political Islam in Aceh.
The first governor of Aceh after 1945, Daud Beureueh, was a reform-minded ulama 
(religious teacher) who aspired to create a "truly Islamic" polity in Aceh.29 His 
government attempted to establish a system of Islamic (syariah) courts, which was to be 
placed under the control of the ulama and function autonomously from the central 
government.30 The rise to power of reformist ulama was contested, however, and 
ultimately the attempts to Islamize the political and juridical system failed, partly 
because of the lack of support from local elites. The latter included conservative 
religious teachers, who, like their counterparts in other parts of Muslim Southeast Asia, 
resisted the reformist movement's attacks on traditional religious practices and 
interpretations of the law. Disappointment among reformist ulama, in combination 
with a range of other social and economic factors, led to the outbreak of a rebellion 
under the banner of Darul Islam ("Abode of Islam," 1953-62). Central to this revolt was 
the idea of a "broken promise." According to Daud Beureueh, President Sukarno had 
promised him, in a personal conversation in 1947, that Aceh would be allowed to 
implement Islamic law. When, in 1951, the government decided to incorporate Aceh in 
the province of North Sumatra, nullifying most of its "Islamic" regulations, this was 
regarded as betrayal.
The Darul Islam insurgency was not designed to separate Aceh from Indonesia, but 
rather to make Indonesia as a whole an Islamic state, based on the primacy of syariah.31 
The revolt was ended when the Indonesian government restored Acehnese autonomy 
in matters of religion, education, and customs. In 1962, Daud Beureueh gave up the 
struggle and retired from politics. Thereafter, the 1965 military coup heralded a period
29 Daud Beureueh was the leader of the reformist Persatuan Ulama-Ulama Seluruh Aceh (PUSA, All- 
Acehnese Association of Ulama). This movement became rather powerful during the Japanese occupation, 
particularly in the domain of Islamic law, which used to be the jurisdiction of the traditional aristocracy 
(the uleebalang). After the Japanese surrendered, the tension between these two groups erupted into a 
violent struggle for power known as the Social Revolution (1945-46). In this brief but intense confrontation, 
the uleebalang were stripped of power. Many were killed or incarcerated. In subsequent years, reformist 
ulama obtained important positions in the provincial government. For a detailed discussion of this period, 
see Anthony J. S. Reid, The Blood of the People: Revolution and the End of Traditional Rule in Northern Sumatra 
(Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979).
30 See Eric E. Morris, "Islam and Politics in Aceh: a Study of Center-periphery Relations in Indonesia"
(PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 1983), pp. 162-63.
31 For discussions of this period, see Kees van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in 
Indonesia (The Plague: Nijhoff, 1981); and Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, The Republican Revolt: A Study of the 
Acehnese Rebellion (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985).
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of strong administrative centralization and a concentration of power in Jakarta, while 
former Darul Islam supporters were transformed, gradually, from rebels into state 
agents.32 Islamic law was not a priority of the New Order regime and the ulama were 
increasingly co-opted or otherwise appeased by the government.33
In the early 1970s, large quantities of oil and natural gas were discovered off the 
coast of North Aceh. The central government's policy to appropriate these resources 
sowed the seed of a new conflict. In 1976, Hasan di Tiro—a grandson of a famous 
ulama, Teungku Cik di Tiro, who fought in the war against the Dutch—established 
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka. GAM came forth, at least partly, from Darul Islam. Unlike its 
predecessor, however, GAM was not primarily an Islamic movement. While Islam 
played a part in its ideology in the early years, in the 1980s and 1990s GAM developed 
a largely secular, ethno-nationalist discourse, directed at "restoring" Aceh to its 
precolonial position as an independent state. When, in 1999, Aceh province was 
allowed the implementation of an Islamic penal code as part of a broader autonomy 
package, the initiative was rejected by GAM as a move to deflect attention from the 
roots of the conflict, and to delegitimize the separatist movement in the eyes of the 
Acehnese people.34
The implementation of a state syariah legal framework was initiated in 2002-03, 
when Governor Abdulah Puteh issued a series of bylaws (qanun) regarding the 
regulation of creed (akhidah), worship (ibadah), and religious symbolism (syiar, a term 
commonly used for manners of conduct associated with the lives of the Prophet or 
saints), as well as the criminal persecution of the use of intoxicants (khamar), gambling 
(maisir), and illicit relations between men and women (khalwat). A set of newly created 
government institutions was given the task of enforcing and socializing these 
regulations, including (besides the already existing Islamic courts and the provincial 
Council of Religious Scholars, Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama, or MPU), the State 
Syariah Agency and a syariah police force.35
In 2004, the Indian Ocean tsunami destroyed the provincial capital Banda Aceh and 
much of the west coast, and took an estimated 170,000 lives across the province. One 
year later, in August 2005, GAM signed a peace agreement with the Indonesian
32 In the 1970s and 1980s, this group—which included many descendants of reformist ulama—became 
known as the "technocrats." See, for example, Edward Aspinall, Is lam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in 
Aceh, Indonesia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 52-55; Tim Kell, The Roots o f Acehnese 
Rebellion, 1989-1992 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1995), pp. 29-32; Morris, "Islam and 
Politics in Aceh," pp. 269-302; and Rodd McGibbon, "Local Leadership and the Aceh Conflict," in 
Verandah of Violence: Background to the Aceh Problem, ed. Anthony J. S. Reid (Singapore: NUS Press, 2006), 
pp. 315-59.
33 See Aspinall, Islam and Nation, pp. 202-8.
34 See Law no. 44/1999 on the Special Status of the Province of Aceh. For a discussion of the stance of, 
respectively, the GAM and the Indonesian government, see Aspinall, Islam and Nation; and Michelle A. 
Miller, Rebellion and Reform in Indonesia: Jakarta's Security and Autonomy Policies in Aceh (London: Routledge, 
2009).
35 For an elaborate discussion of these institutions, see Feener, Shari'a and Social Engineering. See also Moch 
Nur Ichwan, "Official Ulema and the Politics of Re-Islamization: The Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama, 
Shari'atization, and Contested Authority in Post-New Order Aceh," Journal of Islamic Studies 22,2 (2011); 
Lindsey et al., "Shari'a Revival in Aceh," in Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and Institutions, ed. 
R. Michael Feener and Mark E. Cammack (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); and Arskal 
Salim and Azyumardi Azra, Shari'a and Politics in Modern Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003).
68 David Kloos
government (the accord is commonly referred to as the Helsinki MoU36). As a result, 
the rebel movement was disarmed and turned into a political party, Partai Aceh (PA), 
which is currently in control of the government both at the provincial level and in most 
districts. So far, the stance of PA and many of its representatives toward the syariah 
legal system has been ambiguous. In some respects, the state syariah system has been 
further developed. In general, however, Aceh's new leaders have prioritized other 
issues, much to the dismay of pro-syariah advocates.
The implementation of state syariah has been viewed by some scholars as a 
reaction, on the side of the government and an aligned Acehnese elite, to the political 
crisis of the late 1990s.37 Indeed, some people, primarily from GAM or progressive 
activist circles, see the syariah legal framework as something that was forced on the 
Acehnese. Yet, the claim that the Acehnese formulation of syariah was "invented" in 
Jakarta ignores, firstly, the long and complex genealogy of the concept of Islamic law 
and its resonance in Acehnese society, and, secondly, the fact that the syariah legal 
system was built on the basis of a set of local discourses and institutions that has been 
decades in the making.38 In Aceh, the idea that the state has a leading role in guarding 
"correct" Islamic practices and public morality enjoys wide support. Yet, the question 
of how these new regulations should be drafted and enforced, and to what extent and 
on what legal basis the state should be allowed to interfere in local communities and 
private lives, has been passionately debated among religious leaders, in the provincial 
parliament, and at neighborhood coffee shops.39
A central concern in these debates is the position of the ulama. In Aceh, like in other 
parts of Indonesia, a broad distinction is made between (urban-based) ulama whose 
careers are defined by their involvement in state institutions (like the State Islamic 
Institute Ar-Raniry, the MPU, or state syariah institutions, such as the Dinas Syariat 
Islam) and the rural-based leaders (ulama dayah) of traditional religious boarding 
schools (called dayah or pesantren). Although generally supportive of the idea of 
strengthening the status of Islamic law, many ulama dayah have been hesitant, for 
political as well as ideological reasons, to get closely involved in the state syariah
36 Officially, the "Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia 
and the Free Aceh Movement."
37 See, for example, Aspinall, Islam and Nation, pp. 156—49.
38 According to Michael Feener, administrators in Aceh have worked on an ambitious and progressive 
state project directed at the cultivation of a syariah-minded ethics since the 1960s. The "Shari'a project" was 
designed by teachers and scholars affiliated with state institutions such as the IAIN (Institut Agama Islam 
Negeri, State Institute for Islamic Studies) Ar-Raniry (founded 1960) and the Ulama Council (the 
predecessor of the MPU, founded in 1966). It was instrumental in the process of aligning Acehnese ulama 
with the central ideological principles of the New Order by molding Islamic norms and practices (and 
their scriptural justification) in the straitjacket of security and economic growth. In Feener's view, syariah is 
part and parcel of a general government strategy of Islamizing the state, a process tuned to the changing 
lifestyles of the conservative segment of the urban middle class, one of the regime's most loyal 
constituencies. See Feener, Shari'a and Social Engineering, particularly pp. 37-47.
39 For discussions taking place in the public sphere, see Feener, Shari'a and Social Engineering, pp. 216-49.
For ethnographic discussions of the impact of state syariah on Acehnese society and the lives of ordinary 
Acehnese, see David Kloos, "Becoming Better Muslims: Religious Authority and Ethical Improvement in 
Aceh, Indonesia" (PhD dissertation, VU University Amsterdam, 2013); and R. Michael Feener, David 
Kloos, and Annemarie Samuels, eds., Islam and the Eimits of the State: Reconfigurations of Practice, Community, 
and Authority in Contemporary Aceh, Indonesia (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming).
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project.401 will discuss the role of religious leaders in more detail in subsequent 
sections. The remainder of this section serves to look beyond the domains of formal 
politics and religious institutions, and takes into account some of the broader 
developments and shifting discourses that inform the local dynamics of morality 
policing in Aceh.
Recent calls for a vigorous enforcement of scriptural Islamic norms must be viewed 
in the context of post-conflict, post-disaster reconstruction and reconciliation. The 
conflict was experienced by many Acehnese as a period of profound lawlessness. In 
some respects, the implementation of syariah has been viewed as a way to reinstate a 
sense of justice where secular law has failed. Adding to this dynamic, the 2004 tsunami 
and its aftermath have driven the issue of public morality, rather forcefully, to the 
forefront of debates about the future of Aceh. It is common discourse, among both 
administrators and ordinary people, that the tsunami was a "warning" (peringatan), a 
"test" (percobaan), or even a "punishment" for the sinful behavior of the Acehnese. Pro- 
syariah activists have elaborated on this view, for example, by arguing that the post­
conflict, post-tsunami situation offers an unprecedented opportunity for bringing Aceh 
back to its "true" Islamic identity.41 Public discussions of vigilante violence, as a 
legitimate way for local communities to cleanse their villages and neighborhoods from 
sinful behavior, is often framed in this discourse.
Particularly important, with regard to the dissemination and intensification of 
these discourses, is the role of the media, both print and electronic. Reports of morality 
policing commonly blame victims rather than the perpetrators of the violence.42 
Newspapers, including the largest and most widely distributed local daily in Aceh, 
Serambi Indonesia, often report in detail about "sinful acts," while joining in with the 
practice of public shaming by publishing the names and residence of those who are 
caught and punished. Reporters actively seek sensational stories by making use of their 
contacts within the police and the WH, who in turn have stakes in sharing this 
information.43 Journalists are generally not interested in identifying the mobilizing 
agents in the outbreak of mass violence. Instead, instances of citizens taking the law 
into their own hands are framed as "people running amok" (masyarakat mangamuk) or 
as the outbreak of "anarchy" (sudah jadi anarki), implying spontaneity rather than 
organized violence. An interesting development, in this respect, is the increasingly 
stark competition between (self-declared) "pro-syariah" journalists and journalists who
40 Many ulama in Aceh uphold an ambiguous relationship with the state, as they try to strike a balance 
between securing government support and maintaining institutional independence. By "doctrinal 
reasons" I mean that the content of state syariah diverges in a number of important aspects from more 
traditionalist (or "classical") interpretations of Islamic law.
41 For an elaborate discussion of these debates, focusing on the tensions and interactions between the 
different temporalities associated with post-tsunami reconstruction, "development," and the moral 
uplifting of state and society through the implementation of syariah, see Annemarie Samuels, "Hikmah and 
Narratives of Change: How Different Temporalities Shape the Present and the Future in Post-tsunami 
Aceh," in Feener et. al., Islam and the Limits of the State.
42 Sarah J. Newman, "Patrolling Sexuality: A Case Study on Khalwat and Vigilantism in Aceh," paper 
presented at the second ICAIOS (International Centre for Aceh and Indian Ocean Studies) conference, 
Banda Aceh, February 23-24, 2009.
43 See, for example, Benjamin Otto and Jan-Michiel Otto, "Practices and Perceptions of Syariah 
Reinforcement in Banda Aceh: The Wilayatul Hisbah and Local Communities," in Feener et. al., Islam and 
the Limits o f the State.
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are (implicitly or explicitly) accused of taking a "soft" line in matters of Islamic 
morality.44 As we shall see in the case studies below, politicians and other actors with 
stakes in the process of syariah implementation capitalize on this form of polarization.
In contrast, the responses of ordinary Acehnese to the changes wrought on Aceh 
after the tsunami take a more ambivalent form. Many of my interlocutors were 
simultaneously enthusiastic and worried about the ways in which Aceh had been 
"opened up" (sudah terbuka) by the tsunami and the end of the conflict. While they 
were often optimistic about the new opportunities promised by these developments, 
they often expressed mixed feelings about the impact on society of "outside" 
influences.45 Of course, these effects are not found in equal measure throughout Aceh. 
In places that were affected most directly by the tsunami, the sense of loss was 
accompanied by significant social and physical changes, including the arrival of many 
"newcomers" (pendatang). This influx includes relatively "risky" categories from a 
public morality point of view, such as transient single people (young men and women 
looking for jobs, students), but also members of the state security services (police, 
military, and intelligence), commonly glossed by ordinary villagers as aparat (the 
"apparatus"). In such places it seems less clear than in the past who owns what house, 
who lives where and for how long, and, more generally, "what is going on." At the 
same time, increasing mobility is a more general feature of the post-conflict era. 
Military checkpoints, road blocks, and other obstacles to traveling have largely 
disappeared. With many households owning at least one or two motorcycles, people 
increasingly work and study away from home. These changes, together with a sharp 
increase in the use of internet and mobile communication, contribute to an atmosphere 
in which news, rumors, distorted truths, and calls for action travel faster than before. 
As I will show in the cases below, these changes influence the ways in which local 
actors define and act upon local "rules of conduct." Before we move there, however, it 
is important to have a clear picture of morality policing in Aceh, in relation both to the 
implementation of syariah and the social construction of village "territories."
In the Name of Syariah?
As we have seen in the previous section, the framework of state syariah reflects a 
relatively coherent political and ideological agenda, intended to transform Acehnese 
society on the basis of a scripturalist understanding of Islamic norms, and advanced 
and supported primarily by a conservative urban elite and a large cross-section of 
ulama. However, as a more general means to represent practices and attitudes, 
including vigilante action, the syariah label has an older, more diffuse history. While 
syariah was a concern of the state in the 1950s and again since 1999, the concept has also 
functioned throughout the twentieth century as a motivation for vigilantes. Particular
44 A conspicuous example is the announcement, on December 13, 2012, of the "Kaukus Wartawan Peduli 
Syariat Islam" (Assembly of Journalists Who Care about Syariah), which received support from the 
government and from ulama associations. See "Wartawan Gagas Kaukus Pembela Syariat," Serambi 
Indonesia, September 23, 2012; "Ulama dan Pemerintah Aceh Dukung Kaukus Syariat," Serambi Indonesia, 
September 24, 2012; and "Kaukus Wartawan Peduli Syariat Dideklarasikan," Serambi Indonesia, December 
13,  2012.
45 For more elaborate discussions, see Kloos, "Becoming Better Muslims," and Annemarie Samuels, "After 
the Tsunami: The Remaking of Everyday Life in Banda Aceh, Indonesia" (PhD dissertation, Leiden 
University, 2012).
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to the recent period, then, is that different groups and individuals have engaged, 
explicitly, in attempts to "assist" the state in enforcing Islamic law. At the same time, 
not all actions in defense of public morality are connected to the state syariah system. 
Central, in this respect, are the territorial practices and discourses associated with the 
concept of adat (or customary) law. In order to assess why, and on what basis, different 
actors have come to label, or re-label, vigilante practices as either "syariah" or “adat," it 
is important to consider, in the first place, the context of the conflict.
In the late 1980s, students of Teungku Bantaqiah, a charismatic religious teacher 
from Beutong Ateuh, West Aceh, were known for patrolling the roads in their area in 
an attempt to bring people "back to syariah." In one incident mentioned in the 
literature, a Chinese Indonesian was killed for refusing to close his restaurant during 
the fasting month. Teungku Bantaqiah was widely believed to possess magical 
knowledge and associated skills of self-defense (ilmu kebal), and in 1987 the Ulama 
Council declared his teachings deviant.46 In a comparable case, students of Teungku 
Ahmed Dewi, an ulama from Bantayan Idi Cut, East Aceh, chased away young, 
unmarried couples from the beach.47 Both ulama were accused by the government of 
cooperating with GAM. In 1999, Teungku Bantaqiah and fifty-six of his students were 
killed in "one of the more notorious military massacres of 1999."48
In 1999, shortly after the announcement of the "Autonomy Law" (Indonesia's 
Regulation 44/1999, which formalized the opportunity for Aceh to apply Islamic law), 
reports appeared in local newspapers about "headscarf raids" (razia jilbab). In one 
reported incident, a group of masked men stopped a bus of female factory workers in 
Langsa (East Aceh). Seven women were ordered to get off the bus, after which they 
had their hair cut and heads shaven. In response to these disturbing incidents, the local 
women's rights organization Flower Aceh sounded the alarm, alerting "all parties" 
that this violence should stop immediately.49 As suddenly as the problem emerged, the 
harassment stopped again by the end of 1999. Although the perpetrators were never 
identified, it was widely speculated that they were TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, 
Indonesian Armed Forces) elements pretending to be GAM, in order to give the 
separatists a bad name. GAM spokespeople quickly distanced themselves from the 
raids. In contrast, representatives of formal authority in Aceh (e.g., state administrators 
and ulama), as well as most opinion makers, remained conspicuously silent about the 
raids, to the great dissatisfaction of human rights and women's rights activists.50
46 Teungku Bantaqiah and his students were known as the "white robes" movement (Jubah Putih). See 
Dyah Rahmany, Matinya Bantaqiah: Menguak Tragedi Beutong Ateuh (Jakarta: Lembaga Studi Pers dan 
Pembangunan, 2001); Leon Jones, "The Security Disturbances in Aceh during 1990" (working paper,
Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990), pp. 10-11; and Otto Syamsuddin Ishak,
Sang martir: Teungku Bantaqiah (Jakarta: Yappika, 2003).
47 Mahdi Syihab, "Penegakan Syariat: Etnografi aksi razia santri dayah di aceh utara," in Serambi Mekkah 
yang Berubah: Views from Within, ed. Arskal Salim and Adlin Sila (Tangerang: Pustaka Alvabet and Aceh 
Research Training Institute, 2010), pp. 60-61. Reportedly, many of Teungku Bantaqiah's students were 
self-declared former "sinners," who regarded their participation in these raids as a form of personal 
repentance.
48 Aspinall, Islam and Nation, p. 99.
49 "Hentikan kekerasan dalam razia jilbab di Aceh; di Aceh Timur tujuh wanita digunduli," Serambi 
Indonesia, September 18,1999.
50 Jacqueline Siapno, who carried out fieldwork in Aceh in the 1990s, was told by one of her female 
interlocutors that this silence was "perceived by women as condoning street harassment against women." 
In some cases, the violence was even explicitly endorsed. A (male) journalist reportedly stated that "[i]t is
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If the 1999 headscarf raids seem to be directly related to the conflict, the post­
conflict years have seen more, rather than fewer, examples of non-state violence 
carried out "in the name of syariah." Many of these incidents are hardly covert. They 
take place openly, often with the consent (implicit or explicit) of local authorities. In 
2006, a group of young Banda Aceh residents calling itself Tim Anti-Maksiat (TAM, 
Anti-Sin Team) began to patrol areas in and around the city, including the popular 
beach at Lhoknga. At the beach, they "arrested" unmarried couples, after which they 
alerted the WH to further "process" those cases. According to its members, the 
initiative was motivated by the wish to "uphold" syariah throughout Aceh.51 A similar, 
more forceful initiative is the Badan Anti-Maksiat (BAM, Anti-Sin League), founded in 
August 2006 by Fakhruddin bin Hasjmi. This organization, which claimed an active 
membership of three hundred, has carried out raids at beauty salons suspected of 
being brothels and coffee shops where gambling was thought to be taking place, and 
against "indecently dressed" women on the street. Far from being isolated, the BAM 
upholds excellent contacts with the police, the WH, the Ulama Council, the local 
government, the State Syariah Agency, and the leaders of traditional religious 
boarding schools. It has even received funding from the government, and has been 
allowed to join the WH during its operations. In an interview with Michael Feener, 
Fakhruddin described his movement as "helping the state in the effort to implement 
the Shari'a in Aceh."52
The operations carried out by the Badan Anti Maksiat are similar to those of the 
radically Islamist Front Pembelaan Islam (FPI, Islamic Defenders Front), a paramilitary 
group infamous for its violent sweepings of bars and brothels in big cities, attacks on 
religious and gender minority groups, and close ties to the police force and military.53 
The FPI established a branch in Aceh in 2008, but so far its actions have been much less 
extensive and disruptive than in other parts of Indonesia, perhaps because of its ties to 
the military. While some religious leaders have shown signs of sympathy for the 
movement, motivated by the view that the GAM-dominated provincial government 
has not done enough to enforce Islamic law, support for the FPI seems, in general, to be 
marginal.54 Potentially more destabilizing is the phenomenon of ex-GAM combatants 
who, feeling excluded from the privileges and opportunities flowing from the peace 
process, have framed their struggle in religious terms. In at least one case, this led to a 
short-lived and rather shady alliance with the FPI.55
a good thing that someone is forcing [women] to veil. We have been trying to conduct a socialization 
program for veiling since 1995 and have been unsuccessful. So it is a good thing that society is now forcing 
them to do so—if not they will never veil." Jacqueline A. Siapno, Gender, Islam, Nationalism, and the State in 
Aceh: The Paradox of Power, Co-optation, and Resistance (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), pp. 37-38.
51 International Crisis Group, "Islamic Law and Criminal Justice in Aceh," pp. 9-10. It is unclear from this 
report how, and by whom, these people were mobilized.
52 See Feener, Shari'a and Social Engineering, p. 241.
53 See Chaider S. Bamualim, "Islamic Militancy and Resentment against Hadramis in Post-Suharto 
Indonesia: A Case Study of Habib Rizieq Syihab and his Islamic Defenders Front," Comparative Studies of 
South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 31,2 (2011).
54 Marzi Afriko, "Syariat Islam dan radikalisme massa: Melacak jejak awal kehadiran FPI di Aceh," in 
Serambi Mekkah yang Berubah, ed. Arskal Salim and Adlin Sila, pp. 19-56.
55 The so-called Pasukan Peudeung (Sword Force) consisted of followers of Teungku Badruddin, an ulama 
and ex-GAM commander from Sawang, North Aceh, who rejected the Helsinki MoU and turned against 
the Komite Peralihan Aceh (KPA, Aceh Transitional Committee, the civilian organization of ex-GAM
In the Name of Shari'a? 73
In order to analyze the connections between vigilantism and ideas about and 
expressions of "territory," it is helpful to consider the broader history of the relation 
between syariah and adat in the Acehnese context. The preceding paragraphs have 
made it clear that vigilantes of different backgrounds have claimed to defend, or 
properly enforce, Islamic law. For some, like Teungku Bantaqiah, ideological 
motivations may have been paramount. For others, like the mysterious perpetrators of 
the 1999 “raziah jilbab," the term “syariah” seems to have served primarily as a means 
for escalating the political situation. More important, in terms of popular support, is 
the stance of the majority of ulama dayah. Most ulama seem to be supportive of state 
syariah, not just because of the perceived need to "clear" Aceh from sinful behavior, but 
also because of the possibilities it offers for elevating the ulama's political status. 
Different ulama associations have been involved in the process of drafting specific 
syariah regulations, and in a few cases, dayah leaders disappointed with the way in 
which the new laws have been enforced have mobilized their students to "assist" the 
state by carrying out intimidating raids in the close vicinity of the dayah.56
Often, however, the defense of public morality is not, or not primarily, related to 
state syariah. An alternative framework is constituted by the local, ethnically or 
territorially based hybrid structures of moral values, customs, and institutions 
typically glossed as adat. While syariah-centered discourses are typically outward­
looking, directed at the integration of Aceh in the wider Muslim world, adaf-centered 
discourses are tied to the conceptualization of the village as a distinct moral sphere, 
evoking powerful notions of territoriality. Claims to adat complicate the syariah "label," 
for they may be used both to reinforce, and contest, syariah-based notions of public 
morality.
In Aceh, more than in other Indonesian regions (with the exception, perhaps, of 
West Sumatra), the concept of "Islamic law" has been highly politicized since the 
colonial period. In the late nineteenth century, Acehnese resistance against Dutch 
colonialism was dominated by a group of militant ulama, who framed the struggle as a 
"Holy War." In response, and relying partially on the work of orientalist scholars such 
as Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, Dutch administrators began to distinguish, forcefully 
but also rather artificially, between a "universal" Islamic code of law and local customs 
and traditions.57 By the time the Dutch were in control of the largest part of Aceh, from
combatants). Teungku Badruddin, who was held responsible for a wave of conspicuous criminal acts in 
mid-2007, was killed in December of the same year by a commando unit of heavily armed men. The killing 
set in motion a brief, but highly disturbing, spree of kidnappings and shootings in the North Aceh district. 
The Sword Force, which combined the ethno-nationalist discourse of GAM with a radical jihadi ideology, 
became infamous for extorting and intimidating local NGOs as well as harassing "improperly dressed" 
women. See The World Bank, "Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update," August-December 2007; and Jesse H. 
Grayman, Community Perceptions of the Peace Process: Eleven Case Studies for the Multi-Stakeholder Review of 
Post-Conflict Programming in Aceh (MSR) (Jakarta: The World Bank, 2009). Cf. Bobby Anderson, "Gangster, 
Ideologue, Martyr: The Posthumous Reinvention of Teungku Badruddin and the Nature of the Free Aceh 
Movement," Conflict, Security, and Development 13,1 (2013).
56 Mahdi Syahib, "Penegakan Syariat: Etnografi aksi razia santri," pp. 57-92. Radicalization among young 
ulama has been a point of concern. So far, however, attempts by radical jihadists to involve Acehnese ulama 
in their struggle have failed. See, for example, International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in 
Aceh," Asia Report No. 189 (April 2010).
57 According to Snouck Hurgronje, many ulama were frustrated about the lack of interest shown by lay 
Acehnese in the "proper rules" of Islam. In his explanation for this, he cited the adherence to Islam and 
adat as a joint "foundation for Acehnese life." The Acehnese, he argued, saw Islam and adat as 
"inseparable" systems. In practice, however, they did not hold Islamic law very highly, for adat often
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the late 1910s onwards, they continued to regard the ulama, categorically, as a 
potentially dangerous subversive force. In contrast, the place-specific forms of 
authority categorized as adat were formally recognized by the colonial state, and made 
into the exclusive prerogative of the uleebalang, the traditional Acehnese aristocracy.
From the 1930s onwards, reform-minded ulama sought to harmonize Acehnese 
conceptions of adat, as expressed in the tradition of matrilocality and gendered aspects 
of family and village life, with a modernist emphasis on law, discipline, and scriptural 
obligations (ibadah).58 In 1945-46, a social revolution stripped the uleebalang of its 
power, causing a sudden delegitimization of adat as a source of political authority. In 
the second half of the twentieth century, the notion of adat was further depoliticized. 
While this was a general development, taking place throughout Indonesia, Aceh's 
history of rebellion made the official celebration of ethnic identity seem particularly 
important to the national and regional government. In the view of administrators in 
Jakarta and Banda Aceh, the region's "specialness" was to be simultaneously 
emphasized and politically neutralized in order to prevent future trouble.59 Beyond the 
domain of formal politics, however, adat remained an important source of moral 
authority at the village level, evident in the continuation of traditions of matrilocality, 
gender segregation, social control, and conflict resolution.
Just like Snouck Hurgronje's interlocutors more than a century ago, people today 
think of Islam and adat as complementary, rather than conflicting, traditions. As we 
shall see, however, a rather clear distinction is often made between syariah- and adat- 
based approaches to moral transgression. Besides references to secular law (typically 
glossed as "state law," hukum negara) and Islamic law (hukum Islam, or hukum Syariat), it 
is common to refer to customary law (hukum adat), or "village law" (hukum kampung), 
as a legitimate framework for addressing and enforcing social norms. Adat-based 
approaches to local conflicts often are explicitly non-violent, being directed at 
consultation (musyawarah), peace-making rituals (perdamaian), public apologies, ritual 
meals (kenduri), fines (det), and a general emphasis on preventing discord (fitnah) and 
revenge (dendam). At the same time, the use of violence, and the perceived right to 
carry out punishment without consulting village institutions, has been a part of village 
life for a long time, especially in the context of perceived breaches of sexual morality 
and resulting shameful situations.60
turned out to be the "mistress" and religious law "her submissive slave." Analytically, Snouck Hurgronje 
thus distinguished sharply between adat and Islamic orthodoxy as inherently opposing frameworks. 
Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, De Atjehers, vol. I (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1893-95), pp. 68, 74,168.
58 See James T. Siegel, The Rope o f God (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000 [1969]). 
According to Siegel, reformists turned to Acehnese perceptions of masculinity, which placed the 
development of "reason" (akal) in specifically male rites of passage, such as the departure from the family 
house after puberty, religious study in the pesantren, and the practice of merantau (long-term sojourn away 
from home for purposes of work or education) in order to reconcile modernist ideas with Acehnese 
cultural practices.
59 For Aceh's technocratic administrators, adat came to stand for local expressions of dance, art and craft, 
local cuisine, and the specific form of traditional practices, such as weddings. Official efforts to glorify 
Acehnese history and culture were informed not just by the (general) attempt of the New Order to 
separate ethnicity and politics, but were also explicitly designed to "weave Aceh's historical narrative into 
that of Indonesia." Aspinall, Islam and Nation, pp. 35-38.
60 See, for example, T. Bachtiar E. Panglima Polem, "Pengendalian social di Aceh Besar," in Segi-segi Social 
Budaya Masyarakat Aceh: Hasil-hasil Penelitian dengan Metode "Grounded Research," ed. Alfian (Jakarta:LP3ES, 
1977), pp. 108-12.
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When ordinary Acehnese cite adat as a basis for action, this is often a conscious 
choice to exert their agency vis-a-vis the state, revealing a lack of trust in state 
institutions (including those of the syariah legal framework), as well as the fact that 
official legal procedures are generally regarded as costly and tedious.61 It would be 
wrong, however, to speak of a clear-cut struggle between the state and local 
communities. In recent decades, besides a "religious revival," a "revival of tradition" 
has taken place, noticeable in the increase of political claims related to ethnic or 
regional identities and loyalties.62 The state has played an active role in this 
development. While the syariah legal framework constitutes a significant extension of 
the state disciplinary apparatus, institutions of law enforcement have also, 
increasingly, it seems, encouraged local communities to solve local conflicts "between 
themselves," on the basis of adat law.63 In 2006, the provincial government established 
the Majelis Adat Aceh (MAA, Aceh Adat Council), an advisory council, which, among 
other things, has reinstated "traditional" Acehnese institutions, promoted Acehnese 
language and cultural traditions, and sent its representatives to villages in order to 
explain and "socialize" traditional norms and values. In 2008, and in cooperation with 
the UNDP (United Nations Development Program), the MAA published a practical 
"guide" in adat law, intended to help local leaders carry out their role "justly, 
responsibly, and effectively."64 While the MAA has emphasized the consistency of local 
customs and Islamic law, the adat revival shows that state discourses of public morality 
do not revolve solely around the notion of syariah.
The definition and enforcement of local norms is contested, and depends on the 
extent to which community leaders, ordinary citizens, and state institutions are able to 
cooperate and come up with shared conceptions of security, stability, and law 
enforcement. Questions of territoriality take center stage in these debates. In the next 
section I discuss a number of concrete case studies that show how, and under what 
kind of circumstances, contestations about territory and associated concerns of public 
morality can result in violence. The cases indicate an engagement of ordinary villagers 
and state agents in the everyday contestations about moral authority and public space 
in present-day Aceh. They show that violent incidents, more than just the outbursts of 
emotion or anger related to a perceived infringement of religious norms, are part and 
parcel of the social construction of places and reputations.
61 Often, it is stated that it is not necessary to involve the police or the (secular or Islamic) court as long as it 
is possible to deal with the matter "by means of adat" (secara adat or melalui adat). See also the UNDP 
Indonesia dan Badan Rekonstruksi dan Rehabilitasi (BRR) report, "Access to Justice in Aceh: Making the 
Transition to Sustainable Peace and Development in Aceh," 2006, p. 79. Benjamin Otto and Jan-Michiel 
Otto, in a forthcoming article, show that the role of the Wilayatul Hisbah in enforcing syariah is often 
limited to the extent that local communities are willing to cooperate with those police. See Otto and Otto, 
"Practices and Perceptions of Syariah Reinforcement in Banda Aceh."
62 See, for example, Adriaan Bedner and Stijn van Huis, "The Return of the Native in Indonesian Law: 
Indigenous Communities in Indonesian Legislation," Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde 164,2-3 
(2008); Jamie S. Davidson and David Henley, eds., The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics: The 
Deployment of Adat from Colonialism to Indigenism (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2007); Tania M. 
Li, The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2007); and Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken, eds., Renegotiating Boundaries: 
Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007).
63 This results, at least partly, from the peace process, which has required security forces to change their 
attitude toward local communities. I will return to this development in some more detail at the end of the 
fourth section.
64 Majelis Adat Aceh, Pedoman Peradilan Adat di Aceh (2008), p. 3.
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Places and Reputations: Cases of Violence
The cases below report on different kinds of violence. I will deal, in turn, with cases 
of mob violence directed against so-called "deviant" teachings, local youth claiming to 
protect the "good name" of their village, and the activities of an ambitious politician 
interfering in a controversy over public space. Regarded separately, these cases 
provide insight into the variety of different motivations that contribute to the local 
outbreak of vigilante action. Seen together, they reveal a more general pattern 
pertaining to the interrelated dynamics of morality policing, state practice and the 
social construction of locality.
The Criminalization of "Deviancy": The Cases ofTeungku Aiyub and Mirza Alfath
In April 2011, Governor Irwandi Yusuf issued a press statement in which he 
announced a formal ban (in the form of a Peraturan Gubernor, "Governor Decree") of 
fourteen "deviant sects" (aliran sesat). This decision was made after the government of 
Aceh, with the assistance of the MPU, had investigated the practices and doctrines 
allegedly disseminated by seventeen non-mainstream groups.65 While it is possible to 
speculate about Irwandi's motives (up until that point he had rarely expressed an 
interest in such matters, and it is very possible that this was a strategy to attract and 
increase support among conservative religious leaders), there is no question that such 
regulations resonated with fears and tensions within Acehnese society about fringe 
groups trying to lead Acehnese Muslims "astray."
In part, the sensitivity associated with alleged "deviant sects" may be seen as a 
continuation of New Order discourses concerned with "correct religion." It is also, 
however, rooted in an older, more place-specific discourse tied to the need to keep 
Aceh "clean" from harmful "outside" influences. As we have seen, the "opening up" of 
Aceh after the 2004 tsunami, and the subsequent ending of the separatist conflict, has 
led to moral anxieties, which are easily capitalized on by political actors, particularly 
those with a flair for populism. Two recent cases have sparked particular concern, 
inside and outside Aceh. The first deals with the murder of a religious teacher accused 
of deviancy in the district of Bireuen, the second with the near-lynching (and 
subsequent arrest) of a university lecturer accused of insulting Islam in the city of 
Lhokseumawe. I will discuss both cases briefly and in turn.
In November 2012, a religious teacher known as Teungku Aiyub, a resident of the 
subdistrict of Plimbang, Bireuen (on the North coast of Aceh province), was killed by 
an angry mob. During the clash, one of his students and one of his attackers were also 
killed. Ten people were seriously injured. While various versions of the story circulate, 
the general picture is as follows. On the night of November 17, a group of some dozen 
people approached the house ofTeungku Aiyub, who at that moment was giving his 
weekly religious lesson. Teungku Aiyub's group surprised the visitors by coming out 
of the house and attacking them with swords and machetes. The mob fled, only to 
return with many hundreds more. In the meantime, most of Teungku Aiyub's 
followers had fled from the location, leaving behind only three, including Teungku 
Aiyub himself. Police and military officers arrived at the scene after the initial
65 'Pemerintah Aceh Larang 14 Aliran Keagamaan," Serambi Indonesia, April 7, 2011.
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disturbance. However, when the mob returned, the police did not, or could not, 
prevent the murder of Teungku Aiyub. His house was burned to the ground. The 
leader of the accused "sect" and one of his students were shot and also burned, 
apparently before the eyes of the police.66
By the time of the clash, the controversy around Teungku Aiyub had been 
dragging on for almost two years—a period in which the group was regularly accused 
of adhering to deviant teachings. According to villagers, the teacher claimed that the 
places of worship in the village were "not pure," while his followers were prohibited 
from following the imam (village religious leader) in prayer. Villagers were also 
concerned about the lessons taught by Teungku Aiyub about death-related rituals.67 
Finally, there were all kinds of rumors of sexual transgressions being part of the 
"mysterious" meetings in the teacher's house. Unsurprisingly, the case of Teungku 
Aiyub sparked concern among local human rights groups. A KontraS spokesperson 
issued a statement in which he called on all parties involved to "respect the supremacy 
of the law and not to take the law into one's own hands." In addition, he requested that 
the police seriously investigate the case in order to prevent such outbreaks in the 
future.68 According to the district head (bupati), Ruslan M. Daud, an officer from the 
United Nations even came to the village to investigate the case.69
The second case concerns Mirza Alfath, a lecturer at the Law Faculty of the 
Universitas Malikussaleh, in the city of Lhokseumawe (also on the North coast). On 
November 20, 2012, Mirza was accused, via an article in the largest provincial 
newspaper, Serambi Indonesia, of "insulting" Islam and "glorifying Jews" on his 
Facebook page.70 On the same night, a large mob (consisting of "hundreds" of people, 
according to most media reports) gathered in front of his house. Soon thereafter, 
people started throwing rocks at the house.71 Before the situation escalated further, the 
police arrived on the scene, closed off the property, and brought Mirza Alfath "into 
safety" at the police station. In subsequent days, Mirza was questioned by the police 
and by members of the local (Lhokseumawe) branch of the MPU. The council showed 
particular interest in two accusations that raised questions about Mirza, that is, 
whether he was an "atheist" and whether he was a supporter of Israeli policies with 
regard to the Palestine conflict.72 Mirza responded that he had not been understood
66 See, for example, "Malam berdarah di Jambo Dalam," Modus Aceh, November 19-25, 2012; "Inilah 
Kronologis Bentrokan Warga Dengan Kelompok Tgk Aiyub," November 17, 2012, http: / / wartaaceh.com/ 
inilah-kronologis-bentrokan-warga-dengan-kelompok-tgk-aiyub/, accessed July 29, 2014; and "Balai 
Pengajian Diamuk Massa, 3 Tewas dan 9 Luka," November 17, 2012, http: / / www.acehkita.com/ 
berita/balai-pengajian-diamuk-massa-3-tewas-dan-10-luka/, accessed July 29, 2014.
67 "Malam berdarah di Jambo Dalam."
68 "KontraS Ajak Semua Pihak Hormati Hukum," Acehkita.com, November 19, 2012, http:/ / www. 
acehkita.com/berita/ kontras-ajak-semua-pihak-hormati-hukum/, accessed July 29, 2014.
69 "Buntut Bentrokan Plimbang; Bupati Bilang Petugas PBB Akan Turun ke Bireuen," December 5, 2012, 
Atjehpost.com, http:/ /atjehpost.com/read/2012/12/05/30398/15/5/Buntut-Bentrokan-Plimbang- 
Bupah-Bilang-Petugas-PBB-Akan-Turun-ke-Bireuen, accessed December 29, 2012.
70 Teuku Zulkhairi, "Akun Facebook 'Mirza Alfaths' Menghina Islam," Serambi Indonesia, November 20, 
2012 .
71 "Mirza terjaring di jaring Facebook," Modus Aceh, November 26-December 2, 2012.
72 "Dibalik pertemuan Mirza dengan MPU," Modus Aceh, November 26-December 2, 2012. In one 
Facebook posting, Mirza had written that "God is the most creative product of human imagination"
(Tuhan itu produk imajinasi manusia yang paling kreatif).
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correctly, that the nature of his postings was "academic" rather than a reflection of his 
own opinions, and that he had been quoting others in order to raise a debate. On the 
basis of these "interrogations," the MPU concluded that Mirza's Facebook postings 
were "off the mark" (sudah jelas melenceng) and that Mirza was willing to repent for his 
writings. On Friday, November 23, in the presence of a congregation at the Islamic 
Centre Mosque in Lhokseumawe, Mirza publicly admitted his mistake. He asked the 
Islamic community, the Acehnese community, the people of Lhokseumawe, his 
neighbors, and his Facebook network to forgive him for postings that "were 
considered insulting and harmful to Islam." In addition, he confirmed his adherence to 
Islam by pronouncing the confession of faith (syahadat).73 He also promised to leave his 
residence in Keude.
Protecting the Good Name of the Village
In 2009-10, I spent twelve months in Aceh conducting fieldwork in two different 
locations. Blang Daruet is a Banda Aceh neighborhood, which was destroyed during 
the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, and rebuilt afterwards.74 Desa Jurong is a small village 
in Aceh Besar, located just off the main road from Banda Aceh to Medan.75 In both 
locations, vigilante violence occasionally occurred. I will give two examples, one for 
each location.
About half a year before I came to Daruet, a young couple there was accused of 
adultery (zina). The couple was not originally from Daruet—the woman came from the 
mountainous area of Gayo (in the central highlands), while the man was from West 
Aceh. Both of them lived in Daruet alone, on the same street but in separate houses. 
Their neighbors had become suspicious when seeing the woman visiting the man's 
house in the evening. Eventually, a group of villagers, mostly young men aged 
between their late teens and early thirties, mobilized in front of the house to catch the 
two "in the act." The couple was dragged out of the house, the woman covered only in 
sheets. On the street, the man was beaten, and the woman's hair was cut short. 
Afterwards, both of them were "given a bath" (dimandikan, or siram) using filthy water 
from the gutter. When this public cleansing was done, village leaders contacted the 
authorities. The couple was taken on the back of a motorcycle to the police station and 
held for a few days. In the meantime, their parents were summoned to Banda Aceh. 
Upon their arrival, consultations (musyawarah) were held to discuss the way in which 
the case should be "solved" (diselesaikan). Ultimately, matters were settled when the 
couple was married in the Blang Daruet mosque—an event witnessed by many of the 
local residents. Immediately thereafter, the newlyweds moved away from Daruet. The 
village head (geuchik, commonly addressed as Pak Geuchik) told me that he had "no 
idea" where the couple had gone.
73 "Mirza terjaring di jaring Facebook"; "Disaksikan Ribuan Jemaah Salat Jumat, Mirza Alfath Ucapkan 
Dua Kalimat Syahadat," November 23, 2012, http: / /atjehpost.com/read/2012/11/23/28868/15/5/ 
Disaksikan-Ribuan-Jemaah-Salat-Jumat-Mirza-Alfath-Ucapkan-Dua-Kalimat-Syahadat, accessed 
December 29, 2012.
74 A staggering 75 percent of about three thousand total inhabitants of Blang Daruet died as a result of the 
tsunami. The neighborhood was physically reconstructed with the help of two international NGOs. When 
I arrived in 2009, almost all of the survivors had been given a house in which to live.
75 All names referring to people in these two places are pseudonyms.
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Hussein (age twenty-one) was one of the young men who took part in the "arrest." 
When I asked him why such rough treatment was necessary, he gave various reasons. 
Firstly, he argued, the couple was supposed to "learn what shame was" (supaya dia 
tahu main). Moreover, their treatment was meant as a "warning" (peringatan), not only 
to this couple but also to others, that such conduct was not allowed in Daruet. Only in 
this way, Hussein went on, would it be possible to ensure the "good name" of Blang 
Daruet. "If we are soft on them, people in other villages will think that you can do 
whatever you like in Daruet, that it is just free here [betas aja\. The village would attract 
even more sinfulness [tarik maksiat lagi\." He also claimed that "every village 
throughout Aceh [seluruh Aceh]" would react like this.
About the role of local community leaders, different versions circulated. According 
to the geuchik, he was not present at the "arrest." He was only alerted when the 
beatings and the "cleansing" had already taken place. According to Hussein, as well as 
others involved, however, both he and the village imam had been present, standing at 
the back. Regardless of the question of who was speaking the truth, the important 
point is that, according to the geuchik, the arrest was the "business of the pemuda,”76and 
he did not consider it his duty to interfere. As Hussein formulated it, "Pak Geuchik just 
makes sure we do not beat them to death." When I asked "how much" of a beating 
should suffice, Hussein answered: "we beat them until we felt satisfied" (dipukul 
sampai puas).
This does not mean that there was no debate in Daruet about whether this kind of 
violence constituted a proper response to what had happened. I often heard people 
explain that "actually" the beatings and the practice of washing the wrongdoers 
should not be allowed, but that it was difficult to "contain" the youth. Also, people 
generally thought that public anxiety about sexual transgressions (mainly khalwat and 
zina) had increased significantly after the tsunami.
The incident in Jurong concerns a khalwat (seclusion) case, which I witnessed—at 
least partly—myself. In early 2010, two teenagers were "caught" (ditangkap) while 
sitting underneath the house of the girl's grandmother, who was a Jurong resident. The 
boy and the girl came from different villages, and knew each other from school. The 
girl often visited her grandmother (who lived in the house together with her adult son 
and another granddaughter). The group of villagers who came to "arrest" the couple 
comprised five or six young men. Later, they were joined by a dozen others. The pair 
was taken to the village communal hall (meunasah). On the way, the boy received 
repeated blows on the arms and chest (not on the face). At the meunasah, the couple 
was drenched with (clean) water from the tank of the meunasah. After the cleansing, 
village leaders were alerted, including the geuchik, the imam, and one of the leaders of 
the adjacent Islamic boarding school, who was also the head of the Jurong village 
council (teuha peut). A meeting was called (musyawarah), during which the parents of 
the boy and girl were contacted, and directed to come to Jurong. After the parents 
arrived, some village leaders suggested that the couple be married in the dayah 
mosque, but this "solution" was rejected. Instead, the parents apologized to the 
kampung leaders, after which they were allowed to take their children home.
76 Pemuda means "youth" or "young men," and often refers to young men in groups, or gangs. I will return 
to the meaning of this term in the next section.
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One of the key players in this incident was the "head" of the village pemuda, Syihab 
(age twenty-eight). When I asked him, a couple of days after the incident, how he 
viewed the arrest, he answered that, "in Jurong, village law applies [hukum kampung 
berlaku]. It is allowed to receive guests at night, but not to meet in dark spots or in the 
shrubs [semak-semak]. We have rules." Syihab had taken the initiative for the arrest, but 
he regarded all (male) pemuda to be responsible. He mentioned two reasons in 
particular. Firstly, illicit behavior such as khalwat had "damaging" effects on the moral 
integrity of the Jurong residents (merusakkan warga). It was the task of the pemuda, he 
explained, to protect the "good name" of the village. He regarded it as irresponsible to 
"just let pass" (dibiarin aja) such behavior, because the people of Jurong would feel 
ashamed for their village. The second reason was that "state law" (hukum negara, as 
opposed to adat) was, in his view, utterly unreliable. "If we revert to state law, perhaps 
[the problem] won't be dealt with ... We have seen that often enough." This was an 
argument I heard often, both in Blang Daruet and in Jurong.
The geuchik arrived late on the scene, after the beating and the cleansing had taken 
place. When asked about the role of the pemuda, the geuchik was ambiguous. In his 
view, the pemuda were allowed to arrest people—heavy-handedly if necessary—but 
not to carry out punishments. He did not approve of the beatings and the cleansing. 
This punishment was "too harsh" (terlalu keras) and "forbidden by Islam" (agama 
melarang). He occasionally told the pemuda to be calm, but at the same time he stated 
that this was difficult "if emotions are in play" (kalau sudah emosi). There were, in other 
words, limits to his authority. "I can only speak tough to them" (saya bisa ngomong kasar 
dengan mereka). But apparently, this did not always have much effect. A somewhat 
different view was advanced by Abi, the dayah leader and head of the teuha peut. Just 
like the village head, he arrived on the scene after the public shaming had taken place, 
and, unlike the geuchik, he agreed with the punishment. "As kampung leaders, we often 
remind the people about the rules, so this is the logical consequence." The main 
condition, he argued, was that no lasting physical damage was inflicted, for that might 
cause retaliations or even damages to be paid by the village (an important part of adat 
law). He was also less ambiguous about the pemuda. They functioned as a kind of 
"village police," he argued. At the same time, he acknowledged that there was a risk, 
because "children [are] difficult to control" (anak muda, susah dikontrol).
The young woman's Uncle Nasir, who lived in the house where the "arrest" had 
taken place, was furious with the pemuda. At the time the uncle was alerted, the 
cleansing at the meunasah had already taken place. However, he decided not to make a 
scene. He explained to me that this would only have made matters worse, given the 
excitement of the pemuda. At this point, he stated, it was the task of the village 
leadership to "cool them down" (dikasih dingin). Importantly, however, he did not 
contest the general opinion that cases of khalwat should be settled within the village, 
and on the basis of adat law. The pemuda acted wrongly for three reasons. Firstly, at the 
time of arrest, it had been nine o'clock in the evening, one hour before the time limit 
stipulated by a village regulation on adat law (meaning, it was not forbidden for the 
young people to be together at that time; I will return to this matter in the next section). 
Secondly, he said, while pointing out two light bulbs on both sides of the house, the 
only "dark spot" was behind the house, and this is not where the couple had been 
sitting at the time of their arrest. Thirdly, the family had not been given a proper 
warning in advance, which, in his view, was certainly a necessary condition. The
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arrest, in other words, had been illegitimate. "When I ran into Syihab the other day," 
Nasir told me, "he did not dare to look me in the eye. He feels ashamed, because he 
knows he got it wrong." In the meantime, shame had been put on his family, for 
reasons he deemed unlawful.
The Pango Raya Bridge
This case centers on the location of a new bridge, connecting the Ulee Kareng 
district in Banda Aceh to the main road to Medan. The bridge is located next to the 
village of Pango Raya, Aceh Besar. During the first half of 2012, this became a popular 
spot for Banda Aceh youth to "hang out" (nongkrong).77 This situation was disturbed 
three months later, when the location became notorious as a place where violent 
responses against "sinful behavior," carried out by local youth from Pango village, had 
been enacted. Many of these cases involved young courting couples (some of whom 
might have viewed the bridge as a romantic location, while others might have been 
interested primarily in finding a "dark spot," for the bridge was still partly a 
construction site). The bridge became a topic for the media in October, when the vice­
mayor of Banda Aceh, Illiza Sa'aduddin Djamal (of the national Islamic party PPP), 
decided to visit Pango at night, together with the syariah police, to help the villagers 
"restore" the moral order.
The policing actions of the Pango youth have been occasionally violent, with some 
accused wrongdoers getting severely beaten. As far as I can tell, people have not been 
beaten to death, although several have ended up in the hospital. In one case, the 
situation almost escalated when a (male) police officer threatened the youth with a 
gun. No shots were fired, however, and the villagers ultimately persuaded the man 
and his female companion to leave the location.78 In December 2012,1 talked to three of 
the young men involved in the "policing" of the Pango Raya Bridge. They were 
between eighteen and twenty-three years old, and when they spoke about their 
motivations for engaging in regular nightly patrols, they did so in terms of "preventing 
sinful behavior," and "protecting the village" against the dangers coming from 
outside.
Compared to the cases described above, the role of the geuchik, Kamaruzzaman, is 
rather remarkable. According to these youth, it was the village head who first 
"ordered" them to patrol at the bridge and to "throw out" (mengusir) unwanted 
elements. To facilitate these actions, the pemuda were provided with coffee and 
cigarettes (not money). The actions were approved by the local police chief. After a few 
months, the geuchik arranged for a number of big signs to be put up at the bridge,
77 As the Atjeh Post website reported in May 2012, "The long and wide bridge at Pango Raya functions not 
only as a place for traffic and transport. It has also become a cool place for killing time, especially in the 
late afternoon, while waiting for the sun to set. Or at night, while enjoying the flickering stars in the vast 
and infinite sky. Since a few months now this bridge is becoming an alternative place for hanging out for 
the people of Banda Aceh. Particularly for young people who want to spend their time at dusk together 
with their friends of the same age." "Jembatan Pango, Tempat Konkow Baru Kawula Muda Banda Aceh," 
May 25, 2012, http:/ / pemerintah.atjehpost.com/read/2012/05/25/10031 /60/60/ Jembatan-Pango- 
Tempat-Konkow-Baru-Kawula-Muda-Banda-Aceh, accessed December 29, 2012.
78 Most of the information in this section is derived from an interview I had with some of the Pango youth, 
as explained below.
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reading, "Beware! It is forbidden to stay on the bridge at night. At your own risk. 
[Signed] Team Community Pango."79My interlocutors emphasized the significance of 
these signs, both in relation to their own role, and that of the village leadership. While 
it was the geuchik who "took responsibility" by ordering the pemuda to start patrolling, 
the signs were understood, essentially, as evidence that the geuchik had relinquished 
that same responsibility, giving the pemuda "free rein" on the bridge. "The geuchik has 
pulled his hands away from it" (geuchik sudah lepas tangan).
While the geuchik thus played an important role initially, the pemuda were more 
than willing to take up the task. As these young men explained it to me, it was 
important to counter and discourage "transgressions of village norms" (pelanggaran 
norma-norma kampung). By this they meant especially sexual norms: the prohibition of 
(sexual) "immorality" (mesum), illicit "relations" (perhubungan), proximity (khalwat), 
and adultery (zina); but also other disturbances of public order. Thus, in their 
explanations they shifted automatically from chasing away courting couples to 
engaging in a large brawl with a motorcycle gang.80 Allowing such behavior would 
give the outside world the impression that Pango was a "free haven" (tempat bebas), or 
a "village full of adultery" (kampung zina). As was true for their counterparts in Daruet 
and Jurong, the actions by the pemuda were directed at protecting the "good name" 
(:nama baik) of the village. Through the construction of the bridge, the youth argued, 
Kampung Pango Raya had been given a bad name (sudah jelek nama kampung). Violence 
was sometimes unavoidable, they explained, for they were occasionally met with 
resistance. Equally important, however, was the fact that these actions were supposed 
to have a "deterrent effect" (efekjera) on all "sinners" who otherwise might come there.
As mentioned already, a significant factor in the Pango case was the interest and 
presence of vice-mayor of Banda Aceh, Illiza Sa'aduddin Djamal. On October 26, 2012, 
Illiza visited Pango, in the company of the head of the Ulee Kareng Subdistrict and the 
head of the provincial Adat council (MAA), to perform a number of adat rituals 
together with the village Women's Council (Pembinaan Kesejahtaraan Keluarga, PKK). 
She stated that, by doing so, she expressed her "support for local customs [adat- 
istiadat\, especially those which are infused by Islam [yang Islami] and those which do 
not contradict syariah,"81 A few weeks later, on October 13, Illiza visited Pango again, 
this time at night and in the company of the syariah police and a number of 
"community organizations" (organisasi masyarakat), to carry out a raid at the bridge 
together with Pango villagers.82 At this event, which was widely covered in the press, 
Geuchik Kamaruzzaman stated that "the Pango Bridge has become a location for 
hanging out by young couples who are not muhrim [closely related by kin]. This 
location has even been used as a place for using drugs and as a site for illegal road 
racing." Illiza, on her part, announced the "formation" of the Tim Amar Ma'ruh Nahi 
Mungkar Gampong Pango (Team Encouraging Good and Forbidding Evil), consisting
79 "Awas ... ! Dilarang duduk di atas jembatan para malam hari. Risiko tanggung sendiri. Tim Masyarakat 
Pango Raya."
80 Interestingly, they referred to these gangs as "punk groups." As Reza Idria explained it to me, in the 
public opinion in Aceh, a "punk" lifestyle represents all kinds of "sinful," or socially undesirable, behavior. 
Personal communication, December 2012; see also Reza Idria, "Muslim punks and state Shari'a," in Feener 
et. al, Islam and the Limits of the State.
81 "Illiza Serahkan Sange untuk Warga Pango," Serambi Indonesia, September 27, 2012.
82 "Ratusan Warga 'Razia' Muda-Mudi di Jembatan Pango," Serambi Indonesia, October 14, 2012.
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of Pango villagers. According to the vice-mayor, the problem of syariah offences had 
"escalated" in Banda Aceh.83
Illiza's focus on syariah is hardly surprising. During the past years, the 
strengthening of Islamic law has been a spearhead issue in her political campaigns, 
especially in the run-up to elections. However, for the three young people whom I 
interviewed, Islamic law hardly played a role. The only time they referred to the 
particularities of syariah was in the context of Illiza's visit, and when noting that it was 
impossible for the WH to patrol the bridge twenty-four hours a day.
Vigilante Violence and the Struggle for Moral Authority
It is now possible to analyze at a deeper level the positions, attitudes, and agencies 
of different actors involved in carrying out, staging, facilitating, legitimizing, or 
encouraging vigilante violence. As I have argued, contrary to the standard narrative of 
Acehnese history and society, it is important to ask how the state has become 
embedded in Acehnese (village) society, how this process is tied to conflicting interests 
and particular patterns of social interaction, and how these changing configurations 
affect, in turn, the contestations about moral authority currently taking place. As 
foreshadowed in previous sections, a central aspect is formed by the ways in which 
different actors, including village leaders, religious leaders, local youth, and agents of 
the state approach and make use of the concepts of law (hukum) and justice (keadilan), 
and what happens when, evoking once more the work of Joshua Barker, the state 
engages with local conceptualizations of "territoriality."84
Generally, I found, village leaders do not agree that it is acceptable to use violence 
against accused violators of public morality norms. This was my experience in Blang 
Daruet and Jurong, but also in other places I visited. Although my interlocutors used 
different words to express their thoughts, it usually came down to the combined 
argument that beatings and public "cleansings" are neither Islamic nor proper adat 
punishments. Ideally, then, the village leadership should be warned before any 
punitive action takes place, while village consultations (musyawarah) should preclude 
any punishment. "Containing" excited youth, and preventing "anarchy" (anarki) was 
commonly seen as the responsibility of village leaders. However, I was often told by 
village leaders themselves that it was difficult to "contain" the yemuda, and that 
officials often only became involved after the violence had already taken place. One 
possible explanation for this situation is that, in recent years, village leaders—and 
especially the geuchik —have been given more and more responsibilities. As a result, 
they are increasingly unable to keep all village affairs under control. While village 
heads are considered to be adat leaders, who are chosen by the villagers, they are also 
increasingly seen as agents of the state who need to broker government support and
83 For this reason, Illiza stated, the government remained committed to the enforcement of syariah. Still, she 
added, the involvement and the support of the [local] community is an issue of the greatest importance. 
Without the support of [local] residents, these efforts would be in vain. Illiza said, "The Tim Amar Ma'ruh 
Nahi Mungkar, which has already been formed in two villages, namely Kuta Alam and Pango Raya, has 
the authority to keep watch over every breach of syariah that occurs in each respective area, by means of 
persuasion, not by means of violence." Quoted from "Ratusan Warga 'Razia' Muda-Mudi di Jembatan 
Pango," Serambi Indonesia, October 14, 2012.
84 Barker, "Surveillance and Territoriality in Bandung."
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successfully apply for state programs directed at village "development." This double 
role often leads to an entanglement of interests, and—sometimes—to a serious 
compromising of a geuchik's moral authority.
In fact, public order—and especially the (often tediously elongated) processes of 
consultation (musyawarah) and appeasement (perdamaian)—is one sphere in which 
village leaders can try to lighten their traditional "burden." This seems to be especially 
true in the sensitive cases related to accusations of deviancy. In the cases of Tuengku 
Aiyub and Mirza Alfath, village leaders ostentatiously refrained from claiming public 
responsibility.85 In the case of Pango Raya, the geuchik took "forceful action," only to 
negate all personal responsibility a few months later when he put up a few signs. This 
process of refusing responsibility has a flipside, however. There is, throughout Aceh, a 
genuine concern about the "unclarity" of adat regulations. It is a new trend, then, that 
village leaders try to formulate and "officialize" adat regulations. In Jurong, such a 
document was first drafted in 2009, although it was still rudimentary in its phrasing.86 87
In Daruet, the village leadership was working on a qanun gampong (village bylaw), 
which was supposed to contain village rules as well as regulations regarding the 
enforcement of adat.
Moral authority is not limited to village leadership. In particular, the analysis of 
vigilante violence should be extended to the role of religious leaders. As James Siegel 
showed in his classic ethnography of village life in Pidie (North Aceh), in the 1950s 
Acehnese society was characterized by a rather sharp separation between the social 
spheres of the village (gampong) and the institutions of religious scholarship (dayah, or 
pesantren).87 Today, this is much less the case. Although the dayah still represent a 
distinct social setting, with its own norms and codes of conduct, in practice the 
boundaries between village, dayah, and state have become blurred. In the village of 
Jurong, ulama from the nearby dayah combined their role as religious leaders with 
positions in the village administration. At the same time, both ulama dayah and 
members of (local branches of) the MPU actively interfere in local communities, both in 
urban and rural settings, and not seldom after being actively solicited by community 
leaders. Complicating matters even further, ulama dayah are regarded by ordinary 
Acehnese not just as religious leaders, but also as adat leaders (tokoh adat).
The ulama in Jurong told me that they did not approve of the use of violence by the 
pemuda, but that they could do little to prevent it. In fact, indecisiveness is a more 
general pattern in the stance of ulama toward (potentially) violent conflicts and 
incidents. In some cases, this stance seems to be connected to political calculation,
85 In the case of Mirza Alfath, village leaders emphasized that he had come to Desa Keude Aceh only 
recently, and that they knew very little about him. "Mirza terjaring di jaring Facebook."
86 In January 2009, the village leadership of Jurong issued an "announcement" (pengumuman), which was 
signed by the geuchik, the different members of the teuha peut, and the kepala pemuda, and copies were sent 
to the Camat (Subdistrict Head) and the Kapolsek (local chief of police). The document consists of five 
brief statements. The first two concern "customary sanctions" (sangsi adat) for thieves. The final three are 
of a more general nature, stating that "guests may not enter the village after ten o'clock at night," "guests 
who want to spend the night have to report to the assistant village head \ketua lorong]," and "those who 
are in the company of a girl who is not close family [muhrim] at night have to be arrested" (ditangkap). At a 
later meeting, these provisions were further elaborated upon, but those refinements were not included in 
any official document. During this meeting it was decided that violators of public morality (such as those 
drinking alcohol, or engaging in khalwat) should receive three warnings before being "arrested."
87 Siegel, The Rope of God.
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according to which it seems more strategic to remain "silent" than to stand up for (and 
make the impression of "defending") alleged wrongdoers. In other cases, it is due to 
the simple fact that there is no consensus among the ulama regarding what does, and 
what does not, constitute proper adat "enforcement." The chairman of the MPU, 
Ghazali M. Syah, told me in an interview that he did not have a problem with the 
practice of public "cleansing," which he viewed as a "legitimate" adat punishment. He 
did not even regard the practice to be a form of violence, because it does not inflict 
"physical" damage. 88 In contrast, Vice-Chairman Teungku Faisal Ali (who, 
incidentally, has been one of the most prominent and vocal pro-syariah activists in 
Aceh in recent years) stated that this punishment is permitted neither by adat nor by 
Islam, and should be discouraged as much as possible.89
Of course, debate and differences of opinion are a key aspect of traditional Islamic 
scholarship. The problem, then, is that the MPU is a state institution, and that the 
confusion about what should and should not be allowed has a particular impact on the 
way in which the body functions. The case of Teungku Aiyub is a good example. As 
said, when violence broke out in November 2012, the controversy about Teungku 
Aiyub's teachings, and the alleged activities in which his group engaged, had been 
dragging along for at least two years. In fact, this was not the first time that a large 
mob gathered in front of his house. This had happened before, in March 2011.90 At that 
time, Teungku Aiyub was "brought into safety" by the police. In response, the district- 
level Ulama Council carried out an investigation, though without reaching a clear 
conclusion.91 92One of the reasons why the conflict kept festering, then, was that the 
MPU never decided whether the group should be considered a "deviant sect" (aliran 
sesat).'92 Ironically, it was only after the killing of Teungku Aiyub that the MPU, by 
word of its Vice-Chairman Teungku H. Jamaluddin, declared that his group did not 
represent a deviant sect.93 In the case of Mirza Alfath, the MPU reacted less 
indecisively. However, in public statements the blame for the incident was placed 
entirely on Mirza Alfath, while the aggressive demeanor of the crowd was hardly 
called into question.94 Also, no attempts were made by religious leaders involved in
88 Interview with Ghazali M. Syah, December 11, 2012.
89 Interview with Teungku Faisal Ali, December 11, 2012.
90 "Satu lagi: soal dugaan ajaran sesat!" Modus Aceh, March 31, 2011. In this incident, disagreement did not 
result in a clash. However, the mob did burn down Teungku Aiyub's balai (shelter used for teaching), and 
set fire to a vehicle.
91 Ibid.; "Wawancara Sekretaris MPU Bireuen: Jangan terlalu mudah menggolongkan seseorang sesat," 
November 18, 2012, http:/ /atjehpost.com/read/2012/ll/18/28205/15/5/Wawancara-Sekretaris-MPU- 
Bireuen-Jangan-Terlalu-Mudah-Menggolongkan-Seseorang-Sesat-, accessed December 29, 2012. The only 
conclusion from this earlier investigation was that Teungku Aiyub should be forbidden to teach adults 
because he did not possess enough knowledge—not because his teachings were subversive.
92 In the aftermath of the March 2011 incident, MPU Bireuen chairman Teungku Hanafiah Hamza blamed 
Teungku Aiyub's unwillingness to cooperate in the investigation for the fact that it was "difficult to come 
to a conclusion" about his teachings. "Malam berdarah di Jambo Dalam."
93 "Bentrok Bireuen, Ulama: Tak Terbukti Ajaran Sesat," November 17, 2012, http: / / www.tempo.co/ 
read/news/2012/11/17/058442329/Bentrok-Bireuen-Ulama-Tak-Terbukti-Ajaran-Sesat, accessed July 29, 
2014.
94 After meeting with Mirza and interrogating him about his Facebook postings, the MPU concluded that, 
"if he wants to ask forgiveness in front of the community [masyarakat] and pronounces the confession of 
faith [mengucap dua kalimah syahadat] and promises not to do this again, Mirza may be allowed to return to 
his house." "Mirza terjaring di jaring Facebook."
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this case to defuse the disturbing rumors that immediately surrounded the person of 
Mirza as soon as his Facebook postings became an issue in the media.95
In order to assess the effects of these changing leadership roles, it is necessary to 
look closely at the perpetrators, and, in particular, the salient role of the semi- 
institutionalized, young male adults commonly designated as pemuda. In Indonesia, the 
term pemuda has a specific genealogy, which goes back to the struggle for 
independence in the 1940s.96 Here, what concerns me most is the tradition of 
(organized) pemuda to depict themselves as representatives of particular territories 
(mostly the neighborhood, or the village), their pragmatic engagement with different 
moral frameworks (including syariah and adat), and the way in which their references 
to a "deeper solidarity" challenge established forms of authority.97 Typically, the 
pemuda emphasize their responsibility of guarding the village against "disruptions" 
and bad influences from "outside." The latter may include thieves, but also public 
morality breaches. As Syihab, the "head of the pemuda" in Jurong, phrased it, the 
pemuda are those "in front" (di depan), taking care of the boundary between the domain 
of village integrity and the "outside world." The motivation I heard time and time and 
again, in Daruet, Jurong, and Pango, was the need to "protect the good name of the 
kampung."
One factor to take seriously here is a culturally embedded view of masculinity, 
which, in Aceh, builds both on traditions of gender segregation and on the history of 
(armed) conflict. It is often stated in Aceh that young men are "hot-blooded" (darah 
panas) and that they are easily "agitated" (cepat emosi). Acehnese masculinity and the 
responsibility of protecting the kampung against outside influences are interrelated. The 
young men in Pango Raya gave various explanations for the use of violence in their 
attempts to "clear" Pango Bridge from unwanted elements. People might not be 
"deterred" sufficiently, or there might be resistance. But they also freely admitted that 
taking a hard stance felt good. Violence and intimidation were part and parcel of a 
process of cultivating group loyalty and cohesiveness (kekompakkan). To "defend" the 
good name of the village gave them a feeling of "personal pride" (kebanggaan sendiri). 
The visit by the vice-mayor added to this feeling. They were proud to be regarded as 
an "anti-sinning movement" (gerakan anti-maksiat) and joked that the vice-mayor 
regarded them as the "village WH."
95 Take, for example, a rumor reproduced in a report in Modus Aceh. According to the reporter, it was told 
in the neighborhood that, shortly after the police had come to form a "defense line" in front of Mirza's 
house, a mysterious girl had come forward from the crowd. This girl then pointed at a spot on the facade, 
after which she called out: "That is the image of the sun, like the symbol found in the beliefs of the 
illuminati." Subsequently, the reporter ominously comments, "Indeed, in ancient Egyptian mythology the 
sun is a symbol of Dewa Ra. In Judaism, Dewa Ra is claimed to be one of their Gods [sic]. In synagogues, it 
is common to display signs of the sun. So is this deliberate or a mere coincidence? Who knows, perhaps 
only the owner is able to tell." "Mirza terjaring di jaring Facebook."
96 In Java, youth groups manifested themselves as revolutionaries par excellence. Benedict Anderson, in 
his seminal work on Java during the Revolution, explained this by pointing at the specific place of youth 
in traditional Javanese society, with the temporary withdrawal from the village through enrolment in the 
pesantren being the primary rite de passage. Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 1-15. In Aceh, organized youth groups (including the Pemuda 
PUS A) also played a central role in the struggle. See Anthony Reid, The Blood of the People: Revolution and 
the End of Traditional Rule in Northern Sumatra (Kuala Lampur: OUP South East Asia, 1980).
97 Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, p. 186.
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Of course, not all vigilante violence is carried out by the pemuda. Thus, the process 
of constructing localities must be viewed within a broader social and discursive 
context. In both my field sites, a clear distinction was made between "original 
inhabitants" (people who were born in the kampung) and "newcomers" (people who 
had come to live there recently, or people who came to visit or stay temporarily). With 
regard to moral transgressions (including khalzvat and zina, but also, for example, 
alcohol use or more mundane criminal offences such as stealing), the stance of local 
villagers tended to be much harsher toward newcomers than toward original 
inhabitants. It was often explained to me that, if "original villagers" were caught in 
immoral behavior, the village leadership would try to solve the case in a relatively soft 
and inconspicuous way. However, when outsiders misbehaved, this was framed much 
more as a disturbance to the moral integrity of the village, soliciting a tough response. 
The explanation was often the same: if newcomers were not dealt with adequately, this 
may create rumors about their village being "free" (bebas) and unconcerned about 
sinful behavior, thus staining the good name of the village.
The place of state syariah in this discourse is ambiguous. Saiful, a thirty-year-old 
Daruet resident, once asked me whether I had witnessed a public caning. I answered I 
had not, upon which he said: "You should go. Many people come and watch." I asked 
him whether a caning had ever taken place in Daruet. "No," he said. "But this does not 
mean that there have not been violations of syariah [pelanggaran Syariat], there have 
been many!" Most cases, he explained, were handled "internally" to protect the name 
of Daruet. "Just so that the newspapers don't start writing that the people of Daruet 
this, the people of Daruet that [warga Daruet begini, warga Daruet begitu]. When people 
come to Daruet from outside [dari luar], and do bad things here [hal jahat], only then 
[do] we call in the WH." During my conversations with Syihab, the term "syariah" was 
seldom mentioned. The only time that he referred to the system of state syariah was 
when he explained that the WH was an inadequate institution, which, moreover, never 
came to Jurong. This does not mean that he perceived the institutions of "state law" 
(hukum negara), including the ("ordinary") police, to be more adequate. The crucial 
issue was not the distinction between "religious" and "secular" law, but the fact that he 
did not regard the reputation of his village as a responsibility of the state.
In fact, this view is shared by many representatives of the state, particularly the 
police. Often, the pemuda are not held accountable for their actions, and, as we have 
seen, in some cases vigilantes are even openly supported by the police. When the 
police do take action, as in the case of Teungku Aiyub, in Plimbang, their response 
often seems inadequate. To some extent, this may be ascribed to slackness. An often 
underestimated factor, however, is fear. One of my interlocutors in Blang Daruet 
explained that people "know how to use a weapon." Cases such as the outbreak in 
Plimbang show that local police officers are under-equipped, underfinanced, and 
under-supported by the government, which means that, even if the police want to, it is 
difficult to ensure other people's safety without compromising their own.98 With
98 A particularly disturbing fact in the Teungku Aiyub case is that, although the police were on the scene 
after the initial clash, when the mob came back for the second time—this time with many more people— 
the police were unable to keep the situation under control. Ultimately, Teungku Aiyub was shot by the 
police in both his legs. The police chief later declared that they were forced to do so when Teungku Aiyub 
launched an attack with a sword. After this, they could not prevent the killing of Teungku Aiyub, and the 
mutilation of his body. "Polisi: Penembakan Teungku Aiyub Sesuai Prosedur," November 17, 2012,
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regard to the numerous instances of small-scale violence, a more important factor 
seems to be the conviction on the side of state authorities that some problems are better 
left to local communities to resolve. In fact, it seems that local conflicts (including 
public morality breaches) are increasingly viewed as "village" matters, which should 
not concern the police."This sometimes leads to confusion, particularly when cases 
are actively "handed back" to village communities by the police after reports have 
already been filed.
This situation is not generally or categorically rejected by local communities. As I 
have explained, people in Aceh often do not have much trust in (state) law "running its 
course" (hukum berjalan). At the same time, however, it is important for most people 
that the routes to conflict resolution by means of state law (hukum negara) are not 
entirely shut off. Most people think that the use of adat law should be open to some 
kind of appeal. An interesting development, in this respect, is formed by the attempts 
to integrate, more systematically than before, adat law with police tasks, in a 
government program known as polisi masyarakat (polmas, "community police").9 100 In the 
polmas program, village communities are asked by the police to designate one member 
of the village council (teuha peut) to act as a police "counterpart" in addressing adat 
breaches, making sure that public morality issues (such as khalwat and zina) are solved 
without the use of violence. As one spokesperson of an Acehnese community-based 
NGO expressed it to me, the polmas concept constitutes a potentially revolutionary 
attempt at increasing trust between local communities and the state security system.101 
In this design, cases are not just "given back" to the community to solve, but the local 
village community becomes a more integral part of the law-enforcement structure. 
Time will have to tell whether this model has a future.
A Society in Flux
In this essay I have looked at the views and actions of vigilantes, community 
leaders, and state agents in order to investigate the dynamics of public morality and 
vigilante violence in Aceh. Post-conflict, post-disaster Aceh is a society in flux, and in 
recent years concerns about "correct" behavior have been propelled to the forefront of 
political debate. A central element of this process is the content and enforcement of 
Islamic law (syariah), implemented in the region since the early 2000s. Some local
http: / / www.acehkita.com/berita/polisi-penembakan-teungku-aiyun-sesuai-prosedur/, accessed July 29, 
2014.
99 This is confirmed by a Human Rights Watch report, which quotes the chief of police in the Baiturrahman 
subdistrict, Banda Aceh, explaining that the police rarely apprehend the perpetrators of violence in khalwat 
cases: "We never arrest people for that kind of violence, because i f  s hard to prove who was the actor, or 
the couple didn't see who it was. And if it was committed by many people, we can't arrest them all." 
Human Rights Watch, "Policing Morality," p. 49.
100 An interesting initiative, in this respect, is the cooperation among the provincial police force (Kepolisian 
Daerah Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and IAIN Ar- 
Raniry under the title Forum Kemitraan Polisi dan Masyarakat (Forum for Police-Society Partnership). See 
M. Jamil Yusuf, Syukri Syamaun, and Fairus M. Nur Ibrahim, eds., Polmas dan HAM: Dengan pendekatan 
Dakwah dan adat hudaya Aceh (Banda Aceh: Polda Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam dan Fakultas Dakwah IAIN 
Ar-Raniry, 2009). For a more general perspective, see Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia (Polri),
Polmas: Paradigma baru Polri (2010).
101 Interview, Sanusi Syarif, Yayasan Rumpun Bambu, December 14, 2012.
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activist and paramilitary groups have carried out raids, violent actions, and 
punishments to "help" the government in its implementation of syariah. Religious and 
political leaders occasionally support this violence, stating that it constitutes a proper 
way of dealing with moral decline, failing authorities, or both. Not seldom, these 
leaders take a decidedly "pro-syariah" stance. Vigilante violence "in the name of 
syariah," while situated at the margins of (social and political) activism, is a reality in 
contemporary Aceh. The social and political mechanisms that underlie this kind of 
violence cannot, however, explain the outbursts through which ordinary villagers have 
tried to purge their own living environments of moral transgressions. In many such 
cases, syariah is not the central issue. Instead, perpetrators, often local young males, 
point to the need of protecting the "good name" of their village through upholding 
local customs or village law.
Claims to adat form a neglected aspect of contemporary contestations about public 
space and "correct" behavior in Aceh. Just like syariah, the concept of adat is subject to 
continuous reconfiguration, both by the state and by ordinary villagers. Most Acehnese 
value a legal system that consists of a combination of secular law, Islamic law, and 
customary law. Balancing these normative frameworks is difficult, however, since in 
practice the distinction between "traditional" (village) institutions (crucial for adat law 
to come into effect) and the state is not very evident. The sharp line that is often drawn 
between "Aceh" and "Indonesia" tends to hide from view the embeddedness of the 
state in village society. Rather than view the outbreak of vigilante violence as a matter 
to be engaged either by the state or by "traditional" leaders, then, in this article I have 
sought to demonstrate how these spheres of authority interact.
The competition for power and resources in post-New Order Indonesia has come 
with drastic social and political changes. In Aceh, where people are trying to come to 
terms with a history of great suffering and human loss, it has produced a pervasive, 
ongoing, and as yet largely undecided struggle for moral authority. This article departs 
from much of the literature about this subject by analyzing how this process works at 
the level of the village. One of the major strategies that many ordinary villagers pursue 
in order to strengthen their position in this struggle for authority is to guard, protect, 
or attain a sense of order at the level of the hyper-local: a village, a ward, a road, or a 
bridge. Vigilantes, by virtue of their appeal to territory and the reputation of local 
communities, are an integral part of this process. While local leaders often do not 
approve of vigilantism, they also experience difficulties in containing it. This, I have 
argued, results at least partly from the internal contradictions vested in their position. 
Local authorities, including village heads and religious experts, are commonly 
regarded as state agents and community leaders at the same time. Thus, they are 
expected, on the one hand, to manage the village as a point of access to the economic 
and legal resources of the state, and, on the other hand, to protect the moral space of 
the village against internal and external threats. The ability to reconcile these different 
roles depends partly on the social status and personal character of individual leaders. 
At the same time, particular circumstances can be identified that compromise these 
leaders' authority. In many cases, such complications are related to contestations about 
village territory.
In places that were badly hit by the tsunami, like Blang Daruet, social and physical 
disruptions caused by the disaster affected community members' perceptions of the
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village leaders' efficacy, adding to the moral anxiety felt in the context of rebuilding 
communities. In villages that were not affected by the tsunami, however, similar 
problems and doubts also occur. In Jurong, the integrity of the village community had 
eroded as a result of a disruptive conflict over state resources. When local youth 
decided to protect the "good name" of their village, and acted violently against 
"improper" behavior taking place within the boundaries of their community, village 
leaders were too much at odds, and too much lacking in legitimacy, to call the pemuda 
to order. Another set of circumstances relates to the changing spatial connections and 
infrastructural reconfigurations resulting from the post-conflict focus on 
"development." The building of a new bridge at Pango Raya caused a sudden 
realignment of Pango village in a wider moral geography, leading villagers— 
including the village head—to take violent action, and drawing the attention of a 
politician, thus causing further escalation through her attempts to strengthen her 
Islamic credentials. The tragic cases of Teungku Aiyub and Mirza Alfath, finally, show 
that, in some instances, conflicts that started out as relatively isolated affairs may 
transcend the moral spaces in which they first emerged. Thus, they may escalate— 
often under the influence of media reporting—out of proportion to the original 
(perceived) transgression. When many actors with different agendas decide to interfere, 
the risk of violence becomes more likely. Together, the cases discussed in this article 
show that the concept of, and control over, village territories constitutes a central 
aspect of the struggle for moral authority and vigilante violence in contemporary Aceh.
